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Abstract
Corporate governance is not a new issue in today's world. Nevertheless,
addressing the impact of financial information transparency on investor behavior in the
stock market should be explored. With the large number of incidents of accounting
fraud and misstatements revealed in the past five to six years, the integrity of business
financial information becomes an increasingly important issue for investors and the
general public. To provide greater definition of the roles and responsibilities of
publicly-owned company executives and members of their boards of directors, U.S.
President George W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) into law on July 30,
2002.

This act provides a framework for greater financial transparency for

publicly-traded companies and

adds increased monitoring responsibility for

representatives of the accounting and legal professions, as well as adding to the
responsibilities of directors and executives.
There has been little empirical research to explore this phenomenon in the Taiwan
Stock Market. The purpose of this explanatory mixed study was to explore the
relationship between financial information transparency and investor behavior. The study
examined TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions,
investor demographics, and investor experience as significant explanatory variables of
investor behavior in the TSEC.

-.

,

This research design employed a mixed method approach, using 19 closed-ended
questions, plus one open-ended question on a survey instrument. The survey
questionnaire, with a closed-ended 1 to 9 Likert scale, was used to ask participants the
extent to which they agree or disagree (9

=

very strong agree, 5

=

neither agree nor

disagree, 1 = very strong disagree). Collected data was analyzed by SPSS-analysis. Five
different statistical analyses were used in this study; descriptive statistics, correlation
analysis, independent-samples t-test analysis, ANOVA analysis, and multiple regression
analysis.

In this study, investor behavior was measured by an instrument of investor
behavior questionnaire. Three-hundred respondents participated in the data collection.
Using systematic sampling, they were approached to complete the survey questionnaire at
the entrance located outside an underwriter's office. Findings indicated that ownership
structure, financial transparency, and board structure were significant explanatory
variables of investor behavior. Therefore, improved financial information transparency
can lead to an increase investment in the Taiwan Stock Market.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Chapter o n e introduces financial information transparency and corporate ',
governance and its impact on investor behavior. Included are introductions to the
background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose .of :the study, research
questions, importance of the study, research design rationale, and delimitations and
scope.

Background of the Study

For almost a decade the transparency of business financial information has been
an important influence on investors' investment strategies. An increasing amount of
research shows that the availability and quality of companies' financial information are
two major factors influencing investors' investment decisions (Young, 2003). Recent
cases of accounting fraud, financial misstatements and poor corporate governance have
become widely publicized, including financial scandals at Enron, Worldcorn, Adelphia,
Tyco, Global Crossing, NiCor, Sprint, and Merck. These cases, among others, have
caused many investors to lose confidence in capital markets worldwide (Kulzick, 2004;
Ramirez, 2003). According to a 2002 Gallup poll, 70 percent of U.S.investors said that
corporate accounting issues haunted the investment climate (Kulzick, 2004). Since the
Enron scandal, poor corporate governance resulting in a lack of financial information
transparency has shaken public confidence (Young, 2003).

In order to understand the potential impact of financial transparency on investor
behavior, it is important to define the term transparency. Florini (1998) indicates that

transparency is the opposite of secrecy. Secrecy means deliberately hiding one's actions,
while transparency means deliberately revealing them. Financial transparency is one kind
of transparency, typically relevant to finance issues which include information accuracy,
completeness, thoroughness, and timeliness ('v'ishwanath, & Kaufinann, 2001). In today's
sensitive investment environment, many investors focus on the importance of information
transparency in companies' strategies. Lack of information and uncertainty are inherent
features of finance, because players in capital markets are engaged in the trade of
investments and information (Adimati & Pfleiderer, 2000).
The Taiwan Stock Exchange was established on July 10, 1962, and became
operational on December 10th of the same year. The main functions of the TSEC include:
offering the facility for trading securities; making the rules of the stock exchange;
accepting listing applications; arranging the listing of securities;. supervising. securities
trading; and managing and announcing market information. The trading time is from 9
am to 1:30 pm, Monday through Friday. By the end of 2004, the stock exchange had 697
listed companies, 114 security brokers, 47 security dealers, and the total market value of
the stock was 423, 912 million US ,dollars. The total amount of transactions was 723,495
million US dollars, and the domestic individuals completed 76 percent of securities
transactions. The TSEC oversight is done by the National Treasury Department (TSEC,
2004).

Statement of the Problem
Over the past decade, global and national markets have experienced finaneial
crises. A leading reason for these markets' crises was insufficient transparent financial

information. This has negatively impacted public confidence in capital markets
(Sridharan, 2002). Against this backdrop, the U.S. Congress began hearings concerning
Enron in February 2002.

The hearings focused on the misleading accounting

information its corporate leaders had disseminated. As the hearings progressed, they were
expanded to include a broader range of independent outside agencies, such as Arthur
Andersen, which was Enron's auditor.
Corporate scandals such as Enron's have inflicted heavy losses, not only in public
confidence, but also to the U.S. stock market. Kulzick (2004) stated, "Although only
a part of this was attributable to fraud, political momentum built rapidly to install greater
controls to decrease the likelihood of future corporate fraud and to increase financial
transparency in the U.S. financial markets" (p. 43).

Purpose of the Study
The impact of financial information transparency on investor confidence in the
worldwide market was selected for this review because a number of high profile cases of
accounting fraud and misstatements of unprecedented proportion have dominated news
headlines since 2000. Problems at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, and Sunbeam
were daily news, as was the rapid fall of Arthur Anderson. A report issued by the General
Accounting Office in October 2002 stated that one out of every 10 listed public
companies had restated its earnings during the previous five years (as cited in Atkins,
1999).
The goals of the financial transparency regulations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are
to create a governance oversight framework for the accounting profession and its

.

practices, which are deslgned to improve investor confidence in financial capital markets.
The purposes of this research were to explore the relationship between financial
transparency and investor behavior; to examine corporate governance theories, corporate
performance, investor trading behavior, and investor decision-making which was
designed to improve investor confidence in Taiwanese financial markets; and to identify
areas for future scholarly inquiry.

Research Questions and Hypothesis
The aim of this study was to explore the key factors that may explain the impact
of financial information transparency on investor behavior in Taiwanese high-tech
companies that are listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The findings of this dissertation
are likely to make significant contributions to the future design of investor behavior, due
to the in-depth analysis of the characteristics that are inherent in investor behavior.

This research study investigated investors' attitudes and perceptions regarding
information transparency. Specifically, the researcher sought to determine how a certain
set of independent variables affect a particular dependent variable. The major
independent variable used in the study was financial information transparency. The
dependent variable was investor behavior. The central question addressed by this study
was how the level of financial transparency is able to convince an investor to invest, and
repeatedly return to the stock market.
The specific research questions and hypothesis for this study are as follows:

Research Questions

1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of

financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan ,Stock
Market?
2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of
financial information transparency according to demographic variables?
3. Are there difference in TSEC investor behavior according to different

categories of investor experience?
Hypothesis
H: TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions,

investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC.

Importance of the Study

It is worth exploring the significance of the role of government-imposed investor
protection actions, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), on the ethical behavior of
corporate officers, as well as the relationship between the transparency of corporate
financial information and levels of investor confidence. The U.S. Government is looking
to boost international investor confidence levels as explained by Kulzick (2004): "If the
U.S. continues to attract international financial capital and maintain the confidence of
American investors, improving financial transparency is an important goal.
Sarbanes-Oxley provides the tools, although, much of the Act remains to be
implemented" (Kulzick, 2004, Conclusion section, para. 3). Investors expect controls

embedded in the SOX Act to increase the ease of monitoring corporate governance
,

thereby increasing their confidence in the stock market. Future research may reveal

: whether or not SOX is successful in increasing investor confidence in U:S.
This research aimed to investigate the impact of information transparency on
Taiwanese investors; and open the path for further study into the effects of financial
information transparency and improved corporate governance on investor confidence.

Definition of Terms
The theoretical foundation for this study was established through a literature
review of pertinent research. The review included identifying relevant research in the
areas of financial information transparency, transparency requirements, corporate
governance, and investor behavior.
T h ~ sstudy used a quantitative research method and survey questionnaire to
further measure the behavior of those investing in the Taiwan stock market. The
dependent variable is investor behavior.

In order to answer the research questions of this study, the investigation focused
on eight independent variables and one dependent variable. The independent variables
were each linked to two information transparency models (signaling and disclosure), and
three corporate governance theories (agency, stewardship, and stakeholder). These
independent variables are ownership structure and investor relations, financial
transparency and information disclosure, board and management structure and process.
There are four demographic variables: gender, age, level of education, and annual
income. The eighth independent variable is an investor's experience in buying

corporation shares. The dependent variable is investor behavior, which is influenced by
the independent variables.
The research design was conducted using a quantitative method approach and
using closed-ended questions on a survey instrument. The survey included 19
closed-ended questions, plus an open-ended question at the end. The researcher asked
participants to rate the question based on a closed-ended 1 to 9 kikert scale format.

Delimitations and Scope

The main purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of financial information
transparency on investor behavior in Taiwan. For that reason, inclusion factors were
subjects who are familiar with the stock market; who have experience buying corporation
shares from the Taiwan Stock Exchange; whose age is older than 18 years old; and who
are willing to fill out a questionnaire based on investor experience. People who do not
have experience buying corporation shares from the Taiwan Stock Exchange .were
excluded from this study.

CHAPTER I1
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction

Chapter two provides a review of the literature of key concepts in this study. All
pertinent literature has been reviewed for this topic in order to facilitate the theory
development for this study. This scholmly review of earlier work provides an appropriate
history and recognizes the priority of the work of the others. This review focused only on
literature and conclusions directly relevant to the subject and the problem addressed in
the dissertation.
Chapter two begins with business financial information transparency and
disclosure requirements, including a relevant literature review of corporate governance,
corporate social responsibility, and investor behavior.

Literature Review

Business Financial Information Transparency and Disclosure
This theoretical literature review focused on theories of financial information
transparency and the impact of corporate governance on investor confidence. It began
with the concepts and theories of financial information transparency and moved on to
theories of corporate governance, which are both important for understanding investor
confidence and their investment strategies.

Financial Information Transparency
The theoretical base for this section is Signaling Theory which was created by
Spence in 1973. Spence asserted that asymmetric information exists between a company.
8

and investors. Such information asymmetry results in investors misunderstanding the real
operating situation within a company. According to Modigliani and Miller (as Chen,
1999), this theory assumes that because managers often have better information than
outside investors, they sell company stock when they perceive it to be overvalued, and
they sell bonds if they believe the stock is undervalued. Investors understand this
perspective and, as a result, they view insider stock sales as a negative signal. According
to signaling theory, the information asymmetry between internal and external .investors
may create an unfair trading advantage for insiders in financial markets (Chen;. 1999;
Chiang, 2005; Spence, 1973). Information asymmetry potentially creates higher risk for
non-insiders who may not clearly understand a company's performance outlook. (Leland
& Pyle, 1977; Bhattacharya, 1979; Poitevin, 1990; Ravid & Saring, 1991).

Anonymous (1999) defined financial transparency as meaning clarity, clearness,
and comprehensibility about what is occurring within a corporation. The definition of
financial transparency provided by Anonymous was applied to corporations' annual
reports, 10-Ks, quarterly reports, and other published material. After the Enron scandal,
investor expectations of financial transparency in the stock market increased. Holzner
& Holzner (2002) indicated that transparency is "The demand for information freedom,

epitomized by the current movement toward comprehensive transparency, has a long and
troubled history, often advanced by scandals" (p.152). Good management of information
transparency relies on good corporate governance and good ethical behavior (Holzner, et
al., 2002).
Transparency is the reverse of secrecy, and secrecy involves someone trying to
hide some behavior or actions carefully to get benefit for a certain group or individual,

such as insider trading. However, the perception of the degree of information
transparency is experienced by each person individually, and follows personal, specific
emotions.
a

Financial information transparency is one kind of transparency that is

typically relevant to corporate finance issues (Vishwanath, & Kaufmann, 2001).
According to a study by Uddin and Gillett (2002), most financial crises during the past
ten years can be attributed to a lack of companies' financial transparency. According to
Hanson (2003), deficiencies in financial market transparency have been due to imperfect
regulations that have been established to monitor companies' corporate governance and
ethical behavior.
Florini (1998) stated that financial transparency is a behavior which constitutes
appropriate responsibility. A corporation's financial transparency is measured by its
efforts to disclose such information (Anonymous, 1999). One symptom of a lack of
financial transparency is insider trading. Insider trading has been not only an obstacle to
increasing market efficiency, but it has also increased investor concerns about capital
markets (Fried, 2003; Pritchard, 2003). Insider trading usually provides asymmetrical
information to the public (O'Hara, 2000).

Financial Information Disclosure Requirements

Information is reported by representatives of public companies to the public and
addresses SEC requirements. Such information disclosures must be monitored and
overseen by internal control systems as well as third parties, which include companies';
Boards of Directors and the SEC in the U.S. For example, a company's financial
forecast should be approved by its Board's audit committee and public accountant. Only

after such approval is it reported to the SEC and released to the general public (Admati &
,

I

Pfleiderer, 2000). Examples of transparency problems in these types of information
disclosures may include irrelevant, misrepiesented, inaccurate, and/or untimely
information (Admati; et al., 2000; Chiang, 2005; Vishwanath, & Kahfhann, 2001).
Vishwanath and Kauhann (2001) created a model to measure financial
transparency for their methodological study. They came up with the following three
criteria: (a) accessibility, (b) relevance, and (c) quality and reliability. Accessibility
focused on businesses' communication of financial information to the public. This
concept was tested by reviewing Internet, radio, television, newspaper, and other public
notices of companies' financial information. Limitations of measuring accessibility
included recipients' lack of education and/or knowledge of how to utilize the facilities
used to transmit financial information.
The second criterion, relevance, relates to the applicability of the financial
information provided to specific investors. Because it is difficult to determine what
information is appropriate, Vishwanath and Kaufmann asserted that relevance depended
on the situation or condition a specific user faced. For example, banks receive and
review relevant information through companies' balance sheets and income statements
when analyzing loan or mortgage cases. On the other hand, dividend pay-out statements
are very important and relevant financial information for shareholders surveying their
portfolios (Vishwanath & Kaufmann, 2001).

The relevance of information provided by companies varies because different
readers have different information requirements. Irrelevant information may conhse
users or lead them to make incorrect or suboptimal investment decisions for their

personal or professional financial strategies (Vishwanath & Kaufmann, 2001). Therefore,
companies have ethical responsibilities to disclose information that is appropriate to
various users for their evaluation. At the same time, users must have the ability to sift
through the totality of information released by companies in a manner appropriate for
their own particular needs (Vishwanath et al., 2001)
The third criterion studied, quality and reliability, indicates that published
financial information must be effective, clea, and simple. In general, the quality of
companies' financial information is monitored by outside independent agencies such as
public accountants or attorneys, as well as by regulatory bodies such as the SEC.
Released information must also conform to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). The quality and reliability of published financial information is
imperfectly regulated due to the fact that adherence to standards is not enforced or
monitored by independent outside agencies, nor by inside review boards who address
financial information disclosure issues (Vishwanath & Kaufmann, 2001).

As

Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001) state: "the lack of financial transparency and poor
government accountability will be mutually reinforcing. This unregulated environment
underscores the importance of working to improve transparency in the economy as a
whole rather than in narrow sectors." (p.57). Measurements such as those developed by
Vishwanath and Kaufinann are helpful tools.
There are information transparency issues outside the U.S. as well. For example,
after information transparency scandals at Italy's food fm Parmalat and Dutch retailer
Ahold became publicized, European Union of5cials have asked more than 7,000 EU
firms to examine their financial reports under International Financial Reporting Standards

(IFRS) (Jucca, 2004).

Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is concerned with managing the relationship among various
corporate stakeholders, and has existed in business since the origin of the limited liability
form of corporation (Lashgari, 2004). In other words, corporate governance includes the
formal and informal contractual agreements among corporate stakeholders (North, 1994).
There are many theories of corporate governance, and different authors have studied
corporate governance in different ways. In 1996, Hawley and Williams completed a
working paper about corporate governance in U. S. corporations for the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The authors followed the corporate
governance guidance issued by the OECD and explained that the primary theories of
corporate governance were agency theory, stewardship theory, and stakeholder theory.

Agency Theory
Agency theory arises in business management and interacts with behavioral
studies of employer-contractor or employer-employee relations. Agency theory can also
be applied to public and non-profit organizations. Agency theory originally developed
from research dealing with incomplete information in insurance industry contracts
(Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). However, this theory was soon generalized
to apply to public corporations (Jenson and Meckling, 1976; Harris and Raviv, 1978).
The main goal of agency theory is how to get the employee or contractor (agent)
to act in the best interests of the principal (the employer), when the employee or

contractor has an informational advantage over the principal and has 'different interests
from the principal. Sappington (1991) provided a valuable discussion of principal-agent
incentive problems. The agency problem is particularly sharp in Anglo cultures that tend
to have dispersed business ownership where corporations do not have supervisory boards
and little to no direct relationships with their investors (Monks, 1994). When all
shareholders own small minority interests, creating diverse ownership, it is not rational
for any investor to spend hisker time or expense supervising management for other
investors. In any event, small shareholders may lack the power and influence to acquire
information which management should disclose (Monks, 1994).
In their work on agency theory, Hawley and Williams (1996) indicated, "In the
finance view, the central problem in corporate governance is to construct rules and
incentives (that is, implicit or explicit contracts) to effectively align the behavior of
managers (agents) with the desires of principals (owners)" (~121)-In accordance with
proponents of agency theory, governments across the world have developed differing sets
of regulations to oversee corporate governance. Important corporate governance
regulations in the U.S. marketplace include Securities and Exchange (SEC) regulations,
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and, most recently, regulations
introduced by the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 (SOX).

Stewardship Theory
The discussion concerning the concepts of stewardship theory was begun by
Pfeffer (1972), when she asserted the fact that Boards of Directors were redundant
because internal managers are already well-positioned to represent the best interests of a

-
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company's shareholders. Research by Pfeffer (1972) showed that the true value of
external directors is the fact that their presence on a Board enhances external investor
confidence. She found that the more regulated an industry was, the more likely outsiders
were to be present on a company's Board of Directors to reassure regulators, bankers, and
other interest groups. Pfeffer's study was one of the starting points of stewardship theory.
Donaldson expanded the concepts that Pfeffer provided and developed
stewardship theory in 1985, which asserts that internal managers are best positioned to
provide solid corporate governance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Donaldson & Davis
(1994) explained that managers are good corporate stewards and diligently work to attain
high levels of corporate profit and shareholder returns. In commenting on stewardship
theory, Donaldson & Davis pointed out that a non-executive board of directors is an
ineffective control mechanism because members are not intimately involved with the
company and, therefore, lack the in-depth knowledge needed to guide the company to
positive performance. .
Stewardship theory is at the root of organizational and corporate governance
theory as it integrates psychological, sociological, and behavioral systems (Boyd, 1995;
Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Especially in the typical CEO duality structure, stewardship
theory explains that executives have superior information that enables them to make clear,
appropriate decisions for shareholders (Desai, Kroll, & Wright 2003).

Stakeholder Theory
According to stakeholder theory, corporate governance must satisfy the needs of
all stakeholders. Stakeholders include a variety of groups and individuals, such as

.

employees, customers, suppliers, and community members who have legitimate concerns
about a corporation and with whom that corporation was interdependent (American Law

.

Institute, 1992).
In 1984 Freeman created stakeholder theorq; which provided an important
contribution to the existing body of modern financial management and corporate
governance theories (Freeman, 1994).

Hill & Jones (1992) built upon existing

stakeholder theory to explain that the firm does not only belong to shareholders, it also
belongs to stakeholders, and these stakeholders also need to take responsibility for the
firm, and enthusiastically participate with the members of the board of directors to
monitor corporate operating performance (Hill & Jones, 1992). In further explaining
stakeholder theory Clarkson (1994) stated: "The firm is a system of stakeholders
operating within the larger system of the host society that provides the necessary legal
and market infrastructure for the firm's activities. The purpose of the firm is to create
wealth or value for its stakeholders by converting their stakes into goods and services." (p.

In 1995 Blair built upon Freeman's stakeholder theory to propose that: "the goal
of directors and management should be maximizing total wealth creation by the firm"(p.
322). He explained that to best impact a firm's performance, managers and executives
should be given ownership-like incentives. These incentives enhance the prospects of
shareholder wealth creation while providing company leaders with motivation to enhance
value for all stakeholders (Blair, 1995).

Corporate Social Responsibility
I

Jackson (2003) developed a model to explain the impact of inveStor decisions on
corporate performance by focusing on the two concepts of external conditions and
internal conditions. External conditions include protective actions or rules, such as the
SOX Act and SEC regulations, which force company leaders to disclose information.
These external conditions enable investors to have more complete information to help
them evaluate investment opportunities and to develop their strategies.
Jackson (2003) asserted that an internal condition is when a company has the
responsibility to provide training for those who use the companies' financial information.
Although market experts provide a variety of analyst reports, Jackson (2003) asserted that
enhancing one's knowledge and ability to understand companies' financial reports was
important to successful investing practices. Rogers (2003) pointed out that investors need
to have confidence in businesses' governance practices, even for the best performing
corporations. The average investor's "market model" requires the investor's time to learn
how to examine information quality and to meaningfully understand information
disclosures.
The Corporate Social Responsibility Model (CSR) was developed by Epstein in
1987. The CSR Model included business ethics, corporate social responsibility, and
corporate social responsiveness and was designed to explain the relationship and
interactions of a corporation with its internal and external stakeholders (Epstein, 1987).
The Corporate Social Responsibility Model not only. examines aspects of corporate
performance but also evaluates corporate actions (Epstein, 1987). Ross. (2000) further
developed the CSR Model by establishing three major measurements: screening, which
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asserts that investors may eliminate gross polluters and other retrograde companies from
their investments, shareholder activism, which asserts that company may obtain
discussions and suggestions of CSR issues through the annual shareholder meeting, and
community development, which asserts that a company may establish corporate
accountability through interaction with the community. According to the CSR model
corporate social responsibility is positively correlated with corporate performance and is
of concern to investors when creating their long-term investment portfolios (Waring &
Lewer, 2004).

Efficient Market Hypothesis

Market efficiency theory can be traced back to 1970 and Fama's Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH). In this famous hypothesis, Fama developed three degrees of
efficiency, which can be applied to the market. First is strong efficiency, which asserts
that all public and private information impacts a company's current stock price. All
information includes insider information. At this degree, no one outsider and insider can
get a superior benefit.

Second is semi-strong efficiency, which asserts that all public

information is factored into a company's current stock price. Therefore, fkdamental
analyses including economic, industry, and individual company analyses can not be used
to attain superior gain. The third degree, weak efficiency, states that all information about
past prices of a stock are reflected in current stock price. As a result, technical analysis
can not assist an investor looking for superior gain (Chen, 1999; Sarno & Thornton,
2004). Technical atlalysis is based on past transaction data and information to predict
the trend of future stock prices. Fundament analysis is based on the situation of the

economic environment and corporate performance to analyze the reasoned stock price
(Chen, 1999).
Malkiel (2002) built upon existing market efficiency theories to assert that a
company's stock price will reflect published information about a company. Improving
the accuracy and timeliness of information disclosures may help the stock market achieve
more efficiency.

Sarno & Thornton (2004) asserted that existing asymmetrical

information may increase arbitrage behavior in the marketplace. This behavior may make
advantages for arbitragers who get company information first.
Jackson (2003) expanded market efficiency theory and separated this theory into
two groups of different types of individuals. The first group was comprised of experts in
financial markets, such as market analysts. Experts usually had the benefit of obtaining
complete financial information based on their educational background or knowledge.
The second group was the "market model" or the average investor. This group usually
had little relative knowledge or time to read or understand financial information
disclosures. This second class of investors relied on the expertise of financial analysts to
translate disclosure information into investment references or advice. If the first group
evaluated and translated disclosed information to the market efficiently, and the
information disclosures were meaningful, the expert group had a way to approach entry
with sufficient information to move the stock price. The responsibility of the market
experts was to analyze the disclosures and protect the average investors who did not have
ability to meaningfully understand disclosed information (Jackson, 2003).

Investor Behavior
Reasoned Action T h e o y

Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) developed the theory of reasoned action for the
prediction of human behavior intentions. Reasoned action theory integrates physiological,
psychological, and behavioral systems as well as role theory. The reasoned action
model explains that humans often organize their behavior by intention (the original
determination in their mind) and transfer this determination to the action. When humans
receive related information about their intention, it will change the human determination
and reflects in their actions. (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).
Donaldson and Davis (1994) extended the reasoned action model to apply to the
business environment. They asserted that corporate performance will reflect the top
management team's behavior. Positive top management team behavior in a company may
lead to positive corporate governance, and this positive behavior (intention) will lead to
high-quality corporate performance (actions). Investors' behaviors and actions often rely
.

on corporate performance, which include financial, operating, and social responsibilities
of corporate leaders.

In 2002, Uddin and Gillett added to the application of reasoned action theory to
business. They explained that the reasoned action model had two dimensions: constructs
of investor behavior and investors' attitude toward their behavior. Regulation, corporate
governance, corporate performance, and compensation structure will directly effect
investors' intentions and actions. Corporate attitude and investor attitude are expected
to be strongly correlated. Positive corporate attitudes will directly motivate investors'
20

attitudes and affect their behavior and actions in the stock market. Negative corporate
attitude may lead investors to reconsider the inclusion of a company's stock in 'their
portfolios or to discontinue their investment in the stock market.
The following section is a review of research that has tested existing theories of
financial information transparency, financial infomiation disclosure, corporate
governance, and investor confidence.

Empirical Literature

The behavior and confidence of investors have changed recently because of
companies' financial scandals including those at Enron, Arthur Andersen, and Worldcorn.
Additionally, accounting fraud at Tyco and questionable CEO compensation packages at
Tyco and GE have created public awareness of unethical corporate behavior (Moor, &
Swartz, 2003). Healey & Kim, (2003) found that worldwide investor confidence has
declined since the Enron scandal, which is attributable to problems with corporate
financial transparency and information disclosure.

Business Financial Information Transparency and Disclosure
This empirical literature review is about business financial information
transparency and the impact of positive corporate governance on increasing investor
confidence. This section begins with a review of studies about financial information
transparency and is followed by reviews of studies about corporate governance and
investor confidence.

Financial Information Transparency

In 2004, Born, :Giaccotto and Ritsatos published a study that examined America's
insurance industry with respect to signaling theory and financial information transparency.
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Born,
Giaccotto and Ritsatos's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and
contrasting theories about financial information transparency. Empirical studies of
signaling theory and financial information transparency were examined, identifying a gap
in the literature regarding whether regulations and monitoring reduce the degree of
information asymmetry between insurers and investors. Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos'
research hypotheses were that there is a positive relationship between insurers' stock
repurchase announcements and insurers' wealth, and that regulation and monitoring have
positively reduced the degree of information asymmetry between insurers and investors
(Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos, 2004).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the. data producing sample of
49 insurance companies trading on either the New York Stock Exchange or American
Stock Exchange. Reliability and validity were established and data collection procedures
were clearly described.

Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos' findings supported their

hypotheses and used Tobin's Q ratio (Q-Ratio).to process the data .analysis. The Q-Ratio
was calculated by dividing the market values of the insurer's equity and debt by their
book values. A t-test was used to test the difference in mean excess returns between high .
and low Q firms and the difference in mean excess returns across lines of business (Born,
. .

.

.

Giaccotto and Ritsatos, 2004).
Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos' interpretation of their findings was that corporate

.

wealth does have a significant positive relationship on that company's stock repurchase
announcement in the open market. They also concluded that regulation and monitoring
have positively reduced the degree of information asymmetry between insurers and
investors when compared with non-regulated industry firms. This led to the conclusion
that insurers can increase company wealth through stock repurchase in the open market.
The implication is that improving corporate governance can lead to improvements
in information asymmetry between insurers and investors.

Born, Giaccotto and

Ritsatos' findings support signaling theory. Strengths of Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos'
study are its clear hypotheses and variables in stock repurchase and information
asymmetry, and selected reliability and validity of measures of outcome variables which
result in a generally high level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined
procedures allowing replication.
In 2005, Chiang published a study that examined Taiwan's high-tech industry
with respect to signaling theory and financial information transparency. He used a
non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Chiang's literature
review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about financial
information transparency. Empirical studies of signaling theory and financial information
transparency were examined, identifying a gap in the literature regarding the impact of
information transparency on corporate performance especially in the structure of Boards
of Directors and ownership. Chiang's research hypotheses were that there was a positive
relationship between the size of Board of Directors and operating performance, and that
there was a positive relationship between financial transparency and information
disclosure and operating performance (Chiang, 2005).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of

225 high-tech companies in Taiwan. The S&P information transparency measurement
criteria were used to measure the information transparency of selected companies. The
information transparency measurement criteria were developed by S&P for transparency
of ownership structure, investor relations, financial transparency, information disclosure,
and board structure. There were 98 criteria in five categories for a total of 98 points. One
point was awarded to a company for each criterion met (Chiang, 2005). Reliability and
validity were established and data collection procedures were clearly described.
Chiang's findings supported his hypotheses. A multiple regression model (MRM) was
used to process the data analysis. MRM is a widely used and versatile dependence
modeling technique applicable to business decision-making (Chiang, 2005).
Chiang's interpretation of his findings was that corporate transparency does have
a significant positive relationship on a company's operating performance. This led to the
conclusion that companies with good corporate governance have a significant positive
relationship with operating performance. The implication is that improving corporate
governance can lead to improved corporate performance, and outsiders can comfortably
rely on information provided by company leaders to make investment decisions. Chiang's
findings support signaling theory.
Strengths of Chiang's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in corporate
transparency and corporate operating performance, and selected reliable and valid
measures of outcome variables which result in a generally high level of data quality, data
analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by
Chiang are that the sample only included Taiwanese high-tech companies. He also did not

clearly define high-tech company in the study. Therefore, the results are difficult to
generalize to other countries. Future studies should address these threats. to external
validity, followed by replication.

Financial Information Disclosure Requirements

In 2001, Gelb and Strawer published a study that examined American publicly
traded firms with respect to information disclosure and financial information transparency.
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Gelb and
Strawer's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting
theories about financial information disclosure. Empirical studies of financial information
disclosure and financial information transparency were examined, and they identified a
gap in existing literature about an alternative explanation: corporate responsibility and
financial disclosure for increased transparency. Gelb and Strawer's research hypothesis
was that firms that are more socially responsible are more likely to provide more
extensive discretionary disclosures (Gelb and Strawer, 2001).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of
233 publicly traded firms in United States. Annual reports, 10-Ks, quarterly reports, other
published materials, and investor relations programs provided by firms were used to
measure the financial disclosure levels and social responsibility of selected companies
(Gelb and Strawer, 2001). Reliability and validity were established, and data collection
procedures were clearly described.

Gelb and Strawer's findings supported their

hypothesis and they used multiple regression analysis to process the data analysis.
Multiple regression analysis is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling

technique applicable to business decision-making (Gelb and Strawer, 2001).
Gelb and Strawer's interpretation of their findings are that both corporate soc~al
responsibility and financial disclosure have a significant relationship with investor
concern. This led to the conclusion that companies with high disclosure quality will
positively maintain investor relationships. Gelb and Strawer's findings support financial
information disclosure. Strengths of Gelb and Strawer's study are its clear hypotheses
and variables in financial information disclosure and corporate social responsibility, and
selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which result in a generally high
level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing replication.
In 2003, Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier published a study that examined American

publicly traded firms with respect to financial information disclosure and corporate
governance. They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design.
Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's literature review was thorough and current in comparing
and contrasting theories about financial information disclosure. Empirical studies of
financial information disclosure and financial transparency were examined, and they
identified a gap in existing literature about corporate governance: the role of audit
committee disclosures. Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's research hypotheses were that there
is a relationship between the financial disclosure and audit committee performance, and
there is a relationship between corporate governance and audit committee performance
(Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier, 2003).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of
100 publicly traded firms which are the listed Fortune 100 in the United States. Financial
statement analysis measurement criteria were used to measure the financial performance

of selected companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided
into liquidity, asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios
(Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier, 2003). Reliability and validity were established and data
collection procedures were clearly described. Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's findings
supported their hypotheses and used multiple regression analysis to process the data
analysis. Multiple regression analysis is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling
technique applicable to business decision-making (Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier, 2003).
Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's interpretation of their findings is that audit
committee performance does have a significant positive relationship on corporate
governance and financial disclosure. This led to the conclusion that companies with
strong audit committee performance will improve corporate governance. The implication
is that improving corporate governance can lead to improved corporate performance, and
outsiders can comfortably rely on information provided by companies to make
investment decisions. Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier's findings support financial disclosure
theories.
Strengths of Rezaee, Olibe and Minrnier's study are its clear hypothesis and
variables in financial disclosure and corporate governance, and selected reliable and valid
measures of outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality,
data analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations of this
study are that the survey criteria did not include important regulations of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which was enacted into law in 2002. The authors suggested that future study should
address threats to external validity, followed by replication.

Corporate Governzance
Agency Theory

In 2000, Shaw, Gupta, and Delery published a study that examined the United

States' trucking industry with respect to agency theory They used a non-experimental,
causal comparative, quantitative study design. Shaw, Gupla, and Delery's literature
review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about corporate
governance. Empirical studies of agency theory and corporate governance were examined,
identifying a gap in the literature about the impact of a company's performance and

compensation system on agent monitoring. Shaw, Gupta, and Delery's research
hypotheses were that agent monitoring was negatively related to the use of performance
contingent compensation systems, and agent monitoring was positively related to the use
of performance contingent compensation systems (Shaw, Gupta, and Delery, 2000).
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of

1,072 trucking companies with at least 30 total employees in the United States. The
primary criterion for inclusion was response to a 24-pages questionnaire. All measures
were obtained from the questionnaire (Shaw, Gupta, and Delery, 2000). Reliability and
validity were established and data collection procedures were clearly described. Shaw,
Gupta, and Delery's findings supported their hypotheses. They used regression analysis
to test the hypotheses.
Shaw, Gupta, and Delery's interpretation of their findings is that agency
predictions and agent monitoring support compensation systems in the organization. This
led to the conclusion that agency predictions and agent monitoring are positive influences
in the trucking industry. The implication is that the cross-industry sample represents a

more traditional organization of work. Typically managers will spend more time
supervising their front-line employees to ensure the quality of their service. Shaw,
Gupta, and Delery's findings support agency theory. Strengths of this study are its clear
hypotheses and variables in agency and collaborative predictions of performance
contingent compensation, and selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables
which result in a generally high level of data quality, data.analysis, and clearly defined
procedures allowing replication.
In 2003, RandOy, Down, and Jenssen published a study that examined maritime
firms in Sweden and Norway with respect to agency theory and corporate governance.
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. RandOy,
Down, and Jenssen's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and
contrasting theories about corporate governance. Empirical studies of agency theory and
corporate governance were examined, identifying a gap in the literature regarding the
impact ofxcorporateperformance on board performance especially in the structure of
Boards of Directors and ownership. RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's research hypothesis
was that Board ownership and independence have a positive influence on the financial
performance of maritime firms (RandOy, Down, and Jenssen, 2003).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of
59 publicly traded maritime companies in Sweden and Norway. Financial statement
analysis measurement criteria were used to measure the financial performance of selected
companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided into liquidity,
asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios (RandOy;
Down, and Jenssen, 2003). Reliability and validity were established and data collection

procedures were clearly described. RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's findings supported
their hypothesis and used multiple ordinary least-squares regression analysis to process
the data analysis. Multiple ordinary least-squares regression analysis is a widely used and
versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to business decision-making
(RandOy, Down, and Jenssen, 2003).
RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's interpretation of their findings is that Board
independence is associated with higher performance at maritime firms in Sweden and
Norway. This led to the conclusion that Board performance has a significant positive
relationship with financial performance and corporate governance. The implication is that
improving board performance can lead to improved financial performance and corporate
performance, and outsiders can comfortably rely on information provided by company
leaders to make investment decisions.
RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's findings support agency theory. Strengths of
RandOy, Down, and Jenssen's study are its clear hypothesis and variables in Board
independence and financial performance, and selected reliable and valid measures of
outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality, data analysis,
and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by RandOy,
Down, and Jenssen are that the sample only included firms from the maritime industry,
therefore, the results are difficult to generalize to other industries. Future studies should
address these threats to external validity, followed by replication.
Trailer, Rechner, and Hill (2004) conducted a study about agency theory to
examine public-private partnerships and to test agency theory in the United States. They
used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative design, of public-private

partnerships. Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's literature review was thorough and current in

.r

comparing and contrasting theories about corporate governance. Empirical studies of
agency theory were examined, leading to identification of an important gap in the
literature about agency theory and conflict in multiple firms such as public-private

partnerships. Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's research hypotheses were that the division of
revenues between public and private organizations is Pareto optimal, and the structure of
revenue appropriation that grants the public partner non-residual payments will not have
a negative association with the operating efficiency of the partnership (Trailer, Rechner,
and Hill, 2004).
Aprobability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of a
group of private companies in partnership with universities. However, the sample size
was not clearly described in the study. Reliability and validity were established, and data
collection procedures were clearly described. Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's findings
supported their hypotheses and they used a multiple regression model (MRM) to process
the data analysis. Trailer, Rechner, and Hill used the Pareto optimality method to test their
hypotheses. The optimality method is one that balances tradeoffs between the other
stakeholders such that each party is made as well off as possible. Ultimately, tradeoffs
exist such that past a certain point, one party can not benefit further unless another party
becomes worse off (Trailer, Rechner, and Hill, 2004).
Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's interpretation of this finding is that agency problems
exist in public-private partnerships. They concluded that a public organization has a
rwponsibility to its own agent and also needs to ensure the best interests of its customers.
Trailer, Rechner, and Hill's findings support agency theory. Strengths of the study

,

reported by Trailer, Rechner, and Hill are its clear hypotheses and variables in multiple
public-private partnerships, and selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables
which resulted in a generally high level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined
procedures allowing replication. The main limitation is that the sample size was not
clearly stated, and that its results may not be generalizable to partnerships that are not
non-public-private.

Future studies should address these threats to external validity,

followed by replication.

Stewardship Theory
In 2003, Desai, Kroll, and Wright published a study that examined American
manufacturing firms with respect to stewardship theory and acquisition announcements.
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Desai,
Kroll, and Wright's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and
contrasting theories about stewardship and corporate governance. Empirical studies of
stewardship theory and acquisition governance were examined, and the authors identified
a gap in existing literature about corporate governance in organizations. Desai, Kroll, and
Wright's research hypotheses were that the presence of CEO duality will be negatively
associated with acquisition performance, and in the presence of CEO duality, the
percentage of outside board members will be positively associated with acquisition
performance (Desai, Kroll, and Wright, 2003).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of
149 publicly traded U.S. companies. The event-study methodology was used to measure
the acquisition performance of selected companies, and they used cumulative abnormal

returns analysis to estimate each acquiring firm.The event-study methodology is widely
used for measuring the impact of various relevant events on the market value of
corporations (Desai, Kroll, and Wright, 2003). Reliability and validity were established,
and data collection procedures were clearly described. Desai, Kroll, and Wright's
findings supported their hypotheses, and they used a multiple regression model (MREa)
for data analysis. MRM is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling technique
applicable to business decision-making (Desai, Kroll, and Wright, 2003).
Desai, Kroll, and Wright's interpretation of their findings is that outsider board
ownership is positively related to the performance of the entire company after they make
a major acquisition in the presence of CEO duality. These findings led to the conclusion
that an independent leadership structure is more beneficial for acquisition performance.
The implication is that, in the presence of CEO duality, monitoring through a Board of
Directors populated by outsiders is another way to ensure owner-interested action. Desai,
Kroll, and Wright's findings support stewardship theory. Strengths of Desai, Kroll, and
Wright's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in corporate governance and
acquisition performance, selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which
resulted in a generally hgh level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined
procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by Desai, Kroll, and Wright are that
the study did not include institutional investors, because they could affect the relationship
between CEO duality and performance. Future studies should address these threats to
external validity, followed by replication.
In 2004, Leng published a study that examined Malaysian publicly traded
companies with respect to stewardship theory and corporate governance. He used a

'

non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Leng's literature review
was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about corporate
governance. Empirical studies of stewardship theory and corporate governance were
examined, identifying a gap in the literature about corporate governance practices in the
developing countries. Leng's research hypothesis was that there is some quality of
corporate governance that leads to better financial performance (Leng, 2004).
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of

77 publicly traded companies in Malaysia. Financial statement analysis measurement
criteria were used to measure the financial performance of selected companies. Financial
statement analysis measurement criteria were divided into liquidity, asset management,
debt management, profitability, and market value ratios (Leng, 2004). Reliability and
validity were established, and data collection procedures were clearly described. Leng's
findings supported the hypotheses, and he used multiple regression analysis for the data
analysis. Multiple regression analysis is an extensively used and versatile dependence
modeling technique applicable to business decision-making (Leng, 2004).
Leng's interpretation of his findings is that corporate governance does have a
significant positive relationship on a company's financial performance. These findings
led to the conclusion that companies with some quality of corporate governance have
better financial performance. The implication is that improving corporate governance can
lead to improved financial performance. As a result, outsiders can comfortably rely on
information provided by company leaders to make investment decisions. Leng's findings
support stewardship theory. Strengths of Leng's study are its clear hypotheses and
variables in corporate governance and financial performance, as well as its reliable and

.

valid measures outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality
and analysis and clearly defined procedures allowing replication.

Stakeholder Theory

In 1999, Luoma and Goodstein published a study that examined American
publicly traded firms with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate performance. They
used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Luoma and
Goodstein's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting
theories about stakeholder performance. Empirical studies of stakeholder theory and
corporate governance were examined, and the authors identified a gap in the existing
literature about the effect of stakeholder and corporate performance on board composition
and structure. Luoma and Goodstein's research hypotheses was that the Board of
Directors of corporations in more highly regulated industries will have greater
proportions of directors who are non-shareholder stakeholders, and Board of Directors of
larger corporations will have greater proportions of directors who are non-shareholder
stakeholders (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999).
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of

224 publicly traded firms in United States (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). Reliability
and validity were established, and data collection procedures were clearly described.
Luoma and Goodstein's findings supported the hypotheses, and. they used logistic and
hierarchical regression analyses to process the data analysis. These methods are
appropriately and widely used when the dependent variable or independent variables are
dichotomous in a study (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999).

Luoma and Goodstein's interpretation of their findings is that Board of Directors
structure does have a significant relationship with highly regulated industries and
organization size. These findings led to the conclusion that larger corporations, in
particularly have greater proportions of stakeholder representation on their Boards. The
implication is that more highly regulated industries and larger corporations have more
proportions of stakeholder directors on their Board to monitor corporate performance.
Luoma and Goodstein's findings support stakeholder theory. Strengths of Luoma and
Goodstein's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in stakeholder director and board
structure, as well as selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which
resulted in a generally high level of data quality, data analysis, and clearly defined
procedures allowing replication.
In 2003, Riahi-Belkaoui published a study that examined American
manufacturing and service firms with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate
governance. He used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design.
Riahi-Belkaoui's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting
theories about stakeholders. Empirical studies of stakeholder theory and corporate
governance were examined, and the author identified a gap in the existing literature about
intellectual capital and US multinational firm performance. Riahi-Belkaoui's research
hypothesis was that intellectual capital will positively affect financial performance
(Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of
100 manufacturing and service firms in United States. Financial statement analysis
measurement criteria were used to measure the financial.and non- financial performance
I

of selected companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided
into liquidity, asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios
-

(Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003). Reliability and validity were established, and data collection'
procedures were clearly described. Riahi-Belkaoui's findings supported the hypothesis,
and he used a regression model for data analysis. The regression model is a widely used
and versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to business decision-making
(Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003).
Riahi-Belkaoui's interpretation of his findings is that intellectual capital does have
a significant positive relationship on financial performance. This finding led to the
conclusion that companies with good corporate governance concerning intellectual
capital have significantly higher levels of financial performance. The implication is that
improving governance of intellectual capital can create organizational wealth.
Riahi-Belkaoui's findings support stakeholder theory.
Strengths of Riahi-Belkaoui's study are its clear hypothesis and variables in
intellectual capital and multinational firms, and selected reliable and valid measures of
outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality and analysis.
Additionally, the study had clearly defined procedures allowing for replication.
Limitations reported by Riahi-Belkaoui are that the author did not test samples of non-US
firms. Future studies should address these threats to external validity, followed by
replication.
In 2004, Dimovski and Skerlavaj published a study that examined Slovenian
publicly traded companies with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate governance.
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Dimovski

and Skerlavaj's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting
theories about corporate governance. Empirical studies of stakeholder theory and
corporate governance were examined, identifying a gap in the literature about
organizational performance and the influence of information communication technology.
Dimovski and Skerlavaj's research hypotheses were that information and communication
technology have a positive impact on financial performance, and that information and
communication technology have a positive impact on non-financial performance
(Dimovski and Skerlavaj, 2004).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of
867 publicly traded companies in Slovenia. Financial statement analysis measurement

criteria were used to measure financial and non- financial performance of selected
companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided into liquidity,
asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios (Dimovski
and Skerlavaj, 2004). Reliability and validity were established, and data collection
procedures were clearly described. Dimovski and Skerlavaj's findings supported their
hypotheses, and they used structural equation model to process the data analysis
(Dimovski and Skerlavaj,2004).
Dimovski and Skerlavaj's interpretation of their findings is that there is a
significantly positive relationship between information communication technology and
financial performance. This led to the conclusion that a company using information
communication technology can lead to better organizational financial performance. The
implication is that a company using information communication technology can lead to
better organizational financial performance and contribute the result to the stakeholder

and shareholder. Dimovski and Skerlavaj's findings support stakeholder theory.
Strengths of Dimovski and Skerlavaj's study are its clear hypotheses and variables
in information communication technology and organizational financial performance, and
selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which resulted in a generally
high level of data quality and analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing
replication. Limitations reported by Dimovski and Skerlavaj are that there is a need to
expand the sample, and future studies should address these threats to external validity,
followed by replication.

Corporate Social Responsibility

In 2003, McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd published a study that examined American
publicly traded firms with respect to corporate social responsibility and corporate
performance. They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study
'design. McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's literature review was thorough and current in
comparing and contrasting theories about corporate social responsibility. Empirical
studies of corporate social responsibility and corporate performance were examined, and
the authors identified a gap in existing literature about CEO incentives and corporate
social performance. One of McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's research hypotheses
demonstrated the relationship between corporate governance and strong social
performance, which is stronger for firms with a higher percentage of shareholders who
are activist institutional investors (McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd, 2003).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of
374 publicly traded firms in United States. The Kinder, Lindenberg, and Domino (KLD)

database was used to measure corporate social performance of selected companies. The
KLD database is a multidimensional corporate social performance database. There are
,

four dimensions of the KLD database: employee, community, product, and environment,
and each dimension has a scale rating from 0 (neutral) to 2 (significant strengths or
weaknesses) used to evaluate firms (McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd, 2003).

Reliability

and validity were established, and data collection procedures were clearly described.
McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's findings supported their hypotheses, and they used
multiple regression analysis to process the data analysis. Multiple regression analysis is a
widely used and versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to business
decision-making (McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd, 2003).
McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's interpretation of their findings is that corporate
govemance does have a significant positive relationship on a company's corporate social
performance. This led to the conclusion that companies with good corporate govemance
have a positive social performance. The implication is that improving corporate
governance can lead to improved corporate social performance, and this positive social
performance can interest more institutional investors. McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd's
findings support the corporate social responsibility model. Strengths of McGuire, Dow,
and Argheyd's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in corporate social
performance and corporate governance, and selected reliable and valid measures of
outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality and analysis, as
well as clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by McGuire,
Dow, and Argheyd are that this study did not examine the link between social strengths
and weaknesses and firm performance. Future studies should address these threats to

external validity, followed by replication.
In 2003, Snider, Hill & Martin published a study that examined global and
.American publicly traded firms with respect to corporate responsibility and corporate
performance. They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, qualitative study design.
Snider, Hill & Martin's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and
contrasting theories about corporate responsibility. Empirical studies of corporate
responsibility and corporate performance were examined, and the authors identified a gap
in existing literature about corporate social responsibility in the 21Stcentury. Snider, Hill
& Martin's research question was, what is the content of issues within stakeholder groups

that leading firms address on their websites regarding corporate social responsibility
(Snider, Hill & Martin, 2003)?

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing sample of
100 global firms which included 50 U.S. firms. The grounded theory method was used to
measure levels of information transparency of selected companies. The grounded theory
method is a way to methodically collect and analyze data for the building of study (Snider,
Hill & Martin, 2003). Reliability and validity were established, and data collection
procedures were clearly described.

Snider, Hill & Martin's findings supported the

research question, and they used qualitative content analysis to process the data analysis
(Snider, Hill & Martin, 2003).
Snider, Hill & Martin's interpretation of their findings is that this study discloses
that both sets of organizations concentrate attention on a similar set of stakeholders and
approximately the same corporate social responsibility issues. This led to the conclusion
that the most successful firms in the US, and worldwide, concentrate more attention on

corporate social responsibility than other less successful firms do. The implication is that
improving corporate social responsibility can lead to improved corporate performance
and firm success in the United States and worldwide.
Snider, Hill & Martin's findings support the corporate social responsibility model.
Strengths of Snider, Hill & Martin's study are its clear research question and purpose in
corporate social responsibility and corporate performance, and selected reliable and valid
measures, which resulted in a generally high level of data and data analysis, as well as
clearly defined procedures allowing replication. The main limitation reported by Snider,
Hill & Martin was that their qualitative study design did not include quantitative research,
and as a result, researchers do not know how frequently identified CRS Model was
disseminated. They suggested that future research use a quantitative methodology to test
their conclusions.

In 2005, Flouris and Walker published a study that examined the U.S. aviation
industry with respect to investor confidence and financial performance. They used a
non-experimental, causal comparative, qualitative study design. Flouris and Walker's
literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about
investor confidence. Empirical studies of investor confidence and financial performance
were examined, identifying a gap in the literature about the financial performance of full
service airlines in times of crisis. Flouris and Walker's research question included, what
is the content of issues within the aviation industry for lead investors who are interested
in the companies' financial performance (Flouris and Walker, 2005)?

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of
three major full service airlines in United States. Financial statement analysis

measurement criteria were used to measure financial and non- financial performance of
selected companies. Financial statement analysis measurement criteria were divided into
liquidity, asset management, debt management, profitability, and market value ratios
(Flouris and Walker, 2005).

Reliability and validity were established, and data

collection procedures were clearly described. Flouris and Walker's findings supported
the research question, and they used qualitative content analysis for data analysis.
Flouris and Walker's interpretation of their findings is that a company's financial
performance has a positive relationship on investor confidence and interest. This led to
the conclusion that companies with good financial performance, in particular profitability
ratios, will have more interested investors. The implication is that improving financial
performance can attract interested investors and regain their confidence in the stock
market. Flouris and Walker's findings support the investor confidence model.
Strengths of Flouris and Walker's study are its clear research question and
purpose about investor confidence and financial performance, selected reliable and valid
measures which resulted in a generally high level of data and data analysis, and clearly
defined procedures allowing replication. The main limitation reported by Flouris and
Walker was that their qualitative study design did not include quantitative research, and
as a result, the researchers do not know how frequently identified confidence massages
were disseminated. They suggested that future research use a quantitative method to test
their conclusions.

..
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EfJicient Market Hypothesis
In 2004, Fraser published a study that examined U.S. and Japanese investors with
respect to the efficient market hypothesis model and their expectations. She used a
non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Fraser's literature
review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories about efficient
market hypothesis. Empirical studies of efficient market hypothesis and investor behavior
were examined, and she identified a gap in existing literature about how U.S. and
Japanese investors process information, and how they form their expectations of the
future. Fraser's research hypotheses were that both U.S. and Japanese investors will be
pessimistic about their expectations for the future of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
Stock Index and the Japanese Stock Index, if they do not offer timely corporate
information to investors (Fraser, 2004).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of
institutional investors both of United States and Japan. A mailed questionnaire was used
to gather information from selected investors. Reliability and validity were established,
and data collection procedures were clearly described. Fraser's findings supported the
hypotheses. She used multiple regression analysis to process the data. Multiple regression
analysis is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to
business decision-making (Fraser, 2004).
Fraser's interpretation of her findings is that stock market efficiency does have a
significant relationship on investor expectations. This led to the conclusion that investor
expectations will increase in efficient stock markets. The implication is that improving
corporate governance and the efficiency of a stock market can lead to increased investor

expectations, and investors can comfortably rely on information provided by company
leaders to make investment decisions. Fraser's findings support the market efficiency
hypothesis. Strengths of Fraser's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in stock
market and investor expectations, selected reliable and valid measures of outcome
variables, which resulted in a generally high level of data and data analysis, and clearly
defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by Fraser are that the study
did not state the biased nature of expectations. The researcher should avoid bias in the
survey. Also, the author did not clearly state the sample size and how the sample was
selected in the study. Future studies should address these threats to external validity,
followed by replication.
Christopherson and Greqoriou (2004) published a study that examined an
American publicly traded firm with respect to the efficient market model and corporate
performance. They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study
design. Christopherson and Greqoriou's literature review was thorough and current in
comparing and contrasting theories about efficient market hypothesis. Empirical studies
of efficient market hypothesis and corporate governance were examined, and they
identified a gap in existing literature about lagged factors affecting Berkshire Hathaway
returns. Christopherson and Greqoriou's research hypotheses were that there is negative
relationship between high-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's returns, and there is a
positive relationshp between low-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's returns
(Christopherson and Greqoriou, 2004).
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of
Berkshire Hathaway which is listed NYSE and ranked in the Fortune 500. Fifty

macroeconomic variables and market factors were used to survey the organizational
performance of the company.

Reliability and validity were established, and data

collection procedures were clearly described. Christopherson and Greqoriou's findings
supported the hypotheses. They used multiple regression analysis to process data.
Multiple regression analysis is a widely used and versatile dependence modeling
technique applicable to business decision-making (Christopherson and Greqoriou, 2004).
Christopherson and Greqoriou's interpretation of their findings is that there is a
negative relationship between high-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's return, and
there is a positive relationship between low-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's return.
This led to the conclusion that Berkshire's returns can be predicted not only from value
stocks but also from mid cap growth stocks. Christopherson and Greqoriou's findings
support the efficient market theory. Strengths of Christopherson and Greqoriou's study
are its clear hypotheses and variables, selected reliable and valid measures of outcome
variables, which resulted in a generally high level of data quality and analysis, and clearly
defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by Christopherson and
Greqoriou are that the sample only included one unique company; therefore, results are
difficult to generalize to other industries and companies. Future studies should address
these limitations and replicate the study for other firms.

Investor Behavior
Reasoned Action Theory

Uddin and Gillett (2002) published a study that examined U.S. publicly traded
firms with respect to reasoned action theory and the behavior effect of moral reasoning.
They used a non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Uddin and
Gillett's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting
reasoned action theories. Empirical studies of reasoned action theory and the behavior
effect of moral reasoning were examined, and they identified a gap in existing literature
about the effects of moral reasoning and self-monitoring on CFO intentions to report
fraudulent information on financial statements. Uddin and Gillett's research hypothesis
were that high moral reasoners are more influenced than low moral reasoners by their
own attitude towards the behavior. (Uddin and Gillett, 2002).

A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of
2,000 which was drawn from the population of U.S. publicly traded firms. Survey
questionnaires were used to collect data about the reasoned actions of selected companies.
Reliability and validity were established, and data collection procedures were clearly
described. Uddin and Gillett's findings supported the hypothesis. They used multiple
regression analysis for data analysis. Multiple regression analysis is a widely used and
versatile dependence modeling technique applicable to business decision-making (Uddin
and Gillett, 2002).
Uddin and Gillett's interpretation of their findings is that companies with a CFO
with high self-monitoring behavior are more disciplined than low self-monitors. Uddin
and Gillett's findings support reasoned action theory. Strengths of Uddin and Gillett's

study are its clear hypotheses and variables in reasoned action and moral behavior,
selected reliable and valid measures of outcome variables which resulted in a generally
high level of data quality and analysis, and clearly defined procedures allowing
replication. Limitations reported by Uddin and Gillett are that the sample was only 7% of
selected companies. Future studies should address these threats to external validity,
followed by replication.

In 2003, Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary published a study that examined U.S.
high-technology IPOs with respect to reasoned action theory. They used a
non-experimental, causal comparative, quantitative study design. Carpenter, Pollock, and
Leary's literature review was thorough and current in comparing and contrasting theories
about reasoned action. Empirical studies of reasoned action theory were examined, and
they identified a gap in the existing literature about the experience of governance,
principals, and global strategy in IPO firms. Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's research
hypotheses were that there is a positive relationship between firm internationalization and
top management team's global experience, and that there is a positive relationship
between firm internationalization and outside Board members' global experience
(Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary, 2003).
A probability, systematic sampling plan resulted in the data producing a sample of

256 high-technology IPOs in United States. Survey questionnaires were used to collect
data about the reasoned actions of selected companies. Reliability and validity were
established, and data collection procedures were clearly described. Carpenter, Pollock,
and Leary's findings supported their hypotheses, an$ they used the multiple regression
model (MRM) to process the data. MRM is a widely used and versatile dependence

modeling technique applicable to business decision-making (Carpenter, Pollock, and
Leary, 2003).
Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's interpretation of their findings is that firm
internationalization does have a significantly positive relationship with top management
team's experience. This led to the conclusion that a top management team with global
experience has a significantly positive relationship with a firm's internationalization.
Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's findings support reasoned action theory. Strengths of
Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's study are its clear hypotheses and variables in
internationalization and corporate performance, selected reliable and valid measures of
outcome variables which resulted in a generally high level of data quality and analysis,
and clearly defined procedures allowing replication. Limitations reported by Carpenter,
Pollock, and Leary are that the sample only included high-tech companies in the United
States. Future studies should address these limitations of external validity, followed by
replication.
The gap in this literature review is that some researchers have asserted that greater
financial transparency addresses investor needs, enhancing investor satisfaction, and
leading to greater public confidence in financial markets. However, there is little
empirical research to support this claim. Although some researchers have discussed and
examined relationships among financial transparency and investor behavior and positive
investor confidence, no study has yet observed any correlation between investor trading
behavior and the transparency of disclosure information in the Taiwan stock market.
Therefore, additional study in this area is needed to discover if greater financial

transparency in companies listed on the Taiwan stock market is positively correlated with
improved investor confidence in the Taiwan stock market.
s the research will explore the relationship between financial
In order to fill t h ~ gap
information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock Market. The results
of this study may have a contribution for corporations, investors, and the other
researchers. Corporations may benefit greatly by identifying the most important factors of
investors' decisions. Investors may benefit greatly by financial information transparency
survey. Other researchers may benefit by duplicating this study and finding other factors
based on this study.

Summary and Interpretations

The purpose of this review was to explore existing theoretical and empirical
literature about the effects of the transparency of business financial information on
investor confidence, and to examine the relationship between corporate governance and
investor confidence. A general consensus exists that financial information transparency
and disclosure will directly affect investor confidence and stock market efficiency.
Improving corporate governance and regulations will help improve investor confidence in
stock markets.

Theoretical Literature
Financial Information Transparency
In 1973 Spence developed signaling theory, which presented the idea that
unbalanced information exists in current financial markets which may create potential

risks for those using the information (Bhattacharya, 1979; Chen, 1999; Chiang, 2005;
Leland & Pyle, 1977; Poitevin, 1990; Ravid & Saring, 1991). Anonymous (1999) and
Holzner and Holzner (2002) further segmented financial transparency into clarity,
clearness, and comprehensibility, and they asserted that excellent corporate governance
was reflected by good information transparency. Recent financial scandals were caused
by lack of financial transparency, unethical behavior and imperfect regulations (Hanson,
2003; Holzner et al., 2002).

Financial Information Disclosure Requirements
Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001) created a model to measure information
disclosure. This model assesses information using three factors: accessibility, relevance,
and quality and reliability. Accessibility was measured by businesses' communication of
financial information to the shareholders and stakeholders. Relevance was measured by
whether a company provided appropriate information to shareholders and stakeholders.
Quality and reliability were described in that a company needed to provide effective,
clear, and simple information to shareholders and stakeholders (Vishwanath, &
Kaufmann, 2001). A company publishing financial information to shareholders and
stakeholders needs to be supervised by regulatory bodies and the company's audit
committee. Companies are not only monitored by internal control systems such as audit
committees and Boards of Directors, but also need to be overseen by independent
accountants and the SEC. (Admati & Pfliederer, 2000).

Agency Theory
The original concept of agency theory was developed for the insurance industry to
explain the behavior of employer-contractor and employer-employee relationships

(Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). This concept was soon generalized to other
industries (Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1978). The agency problem is a
principle of agency theory which is described as when all shareholders own small
percentages of the capital of a firm so that they lack power and influence to acquire
information and directly oversee the management (Monks, 1994; Hawley & Williams,
1996).
Stewardship Theory

The roots of stewardship theory were developed by Donaldson in 1985 who
integrated psychological and sociological and behavioral systems (Boyd, 1995;
Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Desai, Kroll, and Wright (2003) extended stewardship
theory to explain a manager duality structure. According to stewardship theory, more
regulated firms were more likely to have outsiders on their Boards to reassure
stakeholders about corporate performance.
Stakeholder Theory

Stakeholder theory was developed by Freeman in 1984, providing a significant
contribution to both modem financial management and corporate governance. The
American Law Institute (1992) defined stakeholder groups to include employees,
customers, suppliers, and community members with legitimate concerns about a
corporation (Freeman, 1994). Building upon Freeman's stakeholder theory, Hill and
Jones (1992) and Blair (1995) explained that there is a contract between managers and
stakeholders in certain aspects of firm. Stakeholders enforce and monitor company
managers to create maximum wealth for stakeholders, and this behavior positively
interacts between manager and stakeholders to create win-win situation.

Corporate Social Responsibility

Jackson (2003) developed a model to explain the impact of investor decisions on
corporate performance. This model includes two concepts: internal and external
conditions. Internal conditions refer to the training and education of those who use such
information. External conditions refer to the economic environment and regulations or
rules (Jackson, 2003).
The model of corporate social responsibility was developed by Epstein in 1987 to
examine corporate social responsibility and corporate performance (Epstein, 1987). Ross
(2000) and Waring and Lewer (2002) extended this model to assert that positive social
responsibility by a corporation will attract investor interest.
EfJicient Market Hypothesis

An important and famous theory is Fama's Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).
This model is widely utilized in financial markets and it describes markets as having
three efficiency categories: strong efficiency, semi-strong efficiency, and weak efficiency
(Chen, 1999; Sarno & Thornton, 2004). Timely information disclosures are positively
motivating the stock market toward efficiency (Malkiel, 1992; Sarno et al., 2004).
Building upon previous work, Jackson (2003) developed a model of internal and
external conditions to explain efficient markets. There are two groups in this model, an
experts group and an average investor group. The experts goup usually translates and
analyzes information for the average investor group in the stock market. The average
investor group acts when it receives advice provided by the expert group. This model
provides additional valuable explanations for market efficiency.

'

Reasoned Action Theory

Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) developed the seminal theory for the prediction of
human behavior intentions. This theory integrates physiological, psychological, and
behavioral systems. They explained their reasoned action model in that humans often
organize their behavior by intention (the original determination in their mind) and
transfer this determination to their action. Burnkrant and Page (1988) extended the
reasoned action model to apply to business. They asserted that there is a positive
relationship between corporate performance and investor behavior. In support of reasoned
action theory, Gillett & Uddin, (2002) explained that corporate attitudes and investor
attitudes are expected to be strongly correlated. A positive corporate attitude will directly
motivate investors' attitudes as well as affect their behavior and actions in the stock
market. Negative corporate attitudes may lead investors to reconsider a stock's inclusion
in their portfolios.

Empirical Literature
Financial Information Transparency

In 2004, Born, Giaccotto and Ritsatos published a study that examined the
American insurance industry with respect to signaling theory and financial information
transparency. They found that corporate wealth had a significant positive relationship
on a company's stock repurchase announcement in the open market, and that regulations
and monitoring have positively reduced the degree of information asymmetry between
insurers and investors when compared to non-regulated industries. The implication is that
improving corporate governance can lead to improved information asymmetry between

insurers and investors.
Chiang's 2005 study of 225 Taiwanese high-tech industry firms found that
corporate transparency has a significant positive relationship on a company's operating
performance. His conclusion is that improving corporate governance can lead to
improved corporate performance, and outsiders' comfort with information provided by
company leaders for investment decision supports theories of transparency.

Financial Information Disclosure Requirements
In 2001, Gelb and Strawer published a study that examined 223 American
publicly traded firms with respect to information disclosure and financial information
transparency. Their findings are that both corporate social responsibility and financial
disclosure have a significant relationship on investor concern. This led to the conclusion
that companies with disclosure quality will positively maintain investor relationships.
In 2003, Rezaee, Olibe and Minmier published a study that examined 100
American publicly traded firms with respect to financial information disclosure and
corporate governance. Their findings are that audit committee performance does have a
significant positive relationship with corporate governance and financial disclosure. This
led to the conclusion that companies with strong audit committee performance will
improve corporate governance. The implication is that improving corporate governance
can lead to improved corporate performance, and outsiders can more comfortably rely on
information provided by the company to make investment decision.

Agency Theory
In 2000, Shaw, Gupta, and Delery published a study that examined the United
States' trucking industry with respect to agency theory. They concluded that when

stakeholders more closely monitor the company, there are positive influences on the
compensation system in the trucking industry.
In 2003, RandOy, Down, and Jenssen published a study that examined maritime
firms in Sweden and Norway with respect to agency theory and corporate governance.
They found that Board independence was associated with better firm performance which
led to the conclusion that board independence has a significant positive relationship with
financial performance and corporate governance. The implication is that improving board
independence can lead to improved financial performance and corporate performance,
and outsiders can comfortably rely on information provided by company leaders to make
investment decision.
Trailer, Rechner, and Hill (2004) conducted a study about agency theory to
examine public-private partnerships and test agency theory in the United States. Their
findings are that agency problems exist in the public-private partnerships. They
concluded that a public organization has a responsibility to its own agent and also needs
to ensure the best interests of its customers. There are a significant number of empirical
studies supporting agency theories.
Stewardship Model

In 2003, Desai, Kroll, and Wright published a study that examined American
manufacturing firms with respect to stewardship theory and acquisition announcements.
Their findings are that outsider board participation positively related to acquisition firm
performance in the presence of CEO duality. These findings led to the conclusion that
independent leadership structures are more beneficial for acquisition performance. The
implication is that in the presence of CEO duality, monitoring through the outside Board

of Directors is another way to ensure owner-interested action. Desai, Kroll, and Wright's

findings support stewardship theory.

In 2004, Leng's study about Malaysian publicly traded companies also supported
stewardshp theory by finding that corporate governance has a significant positive
relationship on a company's financial performance. These findings led to the conclusion
that companies with some quality corporate governance leads to better financial
performance. The implication is that improving corporate governance can lead to
improved financial performance, and outsiders can comfortably rely on information
provided by company leaders to make investment decision.
Stakeholder Model

In 1999, Luoma and Goodstein published a study that examined U.S. publicly
traded firms with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate performance. They found
that the Board of Directors structure has a significant relationship with highly regulated
industries and organizational size. Their findings led to the conclusion that highly
regulated industries and larger corporations have greater proportions of stakeholder
directors on their Boards to monitor corporate performance.

In 2003, Rib-Belkaoui published a study that examined American
manufacturing and service firms with respect to stakeholder theory and corporate
governance. His findings were that intellectual capital has a significant positive
relationship on financial performance and that improving intellectual capital governance
can lead to organizational wealth creation.
Dimovski and Skerlavaj's 2004 study examining Slovenian publicly traded
companies found a significant positive relationship between information communication

. .technology

and firm financial performance.

These studies all support stakeholder

theory.
Corporate SocialResponsibility

In 2003, McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd published a study that examined U.S.
publicly traded firms with respect to corporate social responsibility and corporate
performance. Their findings that corporate governance had a significant positive
relationship on corporate social performance led to the conclusion that improving
corporate governance can lead to improved corporate social performance, stimulating
interest by institutional investors.
In 2003, Snider, Hill & Martin examined global and U.S. publicly traded firms to
find that both sets of organizations concentrated on similar sets of stakeholders and
corporate social responsibility issues. They concluded that the most successhl U.S. and
overseas firms concentrate more on corporate social responsibility than less successll
firms do. The implication is that improving corporate social responsibility can lead to
improved corporate performance.
Flouris and Walker's 2005 study examined the American aviation industry with
respect to investor confidence model and financial performance. Their findings that
positive financial performance, in particular, profitability is attractive to investors and
that improving financial performance can lead to more interested investors and regained
market confidence support investor confidence theory,
EfJicient Market Hypothesis

In 2004, Fraser published a study that examined American and Japanese investors
with respect to efficient market hypothesis model and their expectations. Her findings

were that stock market efficiency has a significant relationship with investor expectation
which led to the conclusion that investor expectations will increase with efficient stock
markets. Improving corporate governance and stock market efficiency can lead - to
increased investor expectations.
Christopherson and Greqoriou's 2004 study found that there is negative
relationship between high-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's return, and there is a
positive relationship between low-grade corporate bonds and Berkshire's return. This led
to the conclusion that Berkshire's returns can be predicted not only from value stocks but
also from mid cap growth stocks, supporting the efficient market hypothesis.
Reasoned Action Theory

Uddin and Gillett's 2002 study supported reasoned action theory by finding that
high moral reasoners are more influenced than low moral reasoners by their own attitude
towards a specific behavior. Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary's 2003 study about U.S.
recently IPO'ed high-technology firms also supported reasoned action theory in its
findings that firm internationalization has a significant positive relationship with top
management's global experience.

Theoretical Framework for the Study

The major theories that guide this study consist of signaling theory developed by
Spence (1973), and reasoned action theory developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). The,
theoretical literature begins with the concept of financial information transparency,
corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, market efficiency, and investor
behavior, which is the major area for this study. The theoretical literature emphasizes two

major afenas- financial information transparency and investor perception.. A schematic
model (seeFigure 1) depicts the relationships among the major theories and variables in
this study.

Socio-demographic

Financial information
transparency

Ownership
Structure

Gender

Age

Financial
Transparency

Income
Board Structure

Experience

Investor behavior

Figure 1: Schematic model of variables in this study.
The gap in this literature review is that there is little empirical research to support
the relationship between financial information transparency and investor behavior,
especially in the Taiwan stock market. Therefore, additional study in this area is needed
to discover if greater financial transparency is positively correlated with improved
investor confidence and investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. In order to fill this
gap, the researcher explored the relationship between financial information transparency
and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock Market. The results of this-study may have

contributions for corporations, investors, and other researchers. Chapter 3 presents the
methodology used to answer the research question and explanatory hypothesis.

CHAPTER 111
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Introduction

Chapter three presents a description of the methodology for this study, which
focuses upon the impact of financial information transparency on investor behavior. The
research questions and hypotheses which appear in Chapter I and Chapter I11 evolve from
gaps in the literature. The main purpose of this study is to assess stock market investors' .
feelings, thoughts, and attitudes about the financial information transparency.

Research Design
Research Questions and Hypothesis

The aim of this study is to explore the key factors that explain the impact of
financial information transparency on investor behavior in Taiwanese companies that are
listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSEC). This research study proposes a theoretical
framework based on the modified theory of Gillett and Uddin's study (2002) that includes
corporate governance and corporate performance to explain how financial information
transparency may influence investor behavior.
Research Questions

The major research questions that were addressed by this study are as follows:

1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock
Market?

2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of
financial information transparency according to demographic variables?
3. Are there differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different
categories of investor experience?

Hypothesis
The following hypothesis guided the research of this study:

H TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions,
investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC.

In order to answer the research questions and test the hypothesis, the research
focused on eight independent variables and one dependent variable.

Quantitative Method Approach
The five research questions lead to the development of a non-experimental survey
research study. The research design employed a mixed method approach using 19
closed-ended questions, plus one open-ended question on a survey instrument. Baker
(1999) declared that quantitative research seeks to establish facts, make predictions, and
test hypotheses that have already been stated. Babbie (2002) defined the difference
between qualitative and quantitative data as, "quantitative data are numerical data;
qualitative data are not." (p.39). Anderson and Kanuka (2003) explained that quantitative
methods allow researchers using a variety of mathematical techniques to investigate the
relationship between the data in descriptions, correlations, significant differences, or

multivariate relationships. Analysis is the process that attempts to find answers from
collecting data.
Due to the character of quantitative research, certain types of research that study
the preferences, practices, attitudes, or interests of some groups of people are more likely
to be carried out by this method, rather than the methods involved in qualitative research
(Creswell, 2002). Generally speaking, the aim of quantitative research methodology is to
determine whether a particular population shares certain characteristics in common.

Depnition of Terms
There are a total of nine variables used in this study, which include one dependent
variable and eight independent variables. The definitions of each variable are as follows:
Independent variables:
Demographic variables:
Age: In this research study, age is divided into four groups: 18-30 years, 31-45
years, 46-60 years, and more than 60.
Gender: In this research study, gender is divided into two groups: males and
females.
Education level: In this research study, education level is divided into four groups:
high school degree or under, 2 years college degree, Bachelors degree, and
Masters degree or above.
Annual income: In this research study, annual income is divided into four groups:
less than 10,000 USD, 10,000 to 25,000 USD, 25,001 to 35,000 USD, and
more than 35,000 USD.

Experience of buying shares: In this research study, buying shares experience is
divided into three groups: less than 4 years experience, 4 to 9 years experience, and more
than 9 years experience.

Financial information transparency (FIT):The financial information transparency
measurement criteria were divided by S&P in transparency of ownership structure,
investor relations, financial transparency, information disclosure, and board structure.
There were 98 criteria with 98 points in five categories, and one point was awarded to
each company that met the criteria (S&P's company, 2002, Chiang, 2005). Based on
abovementioned descriptions, the researcher defined FIT in this study as: FIT is the
persuasion of investors by using logic in the stock market. This study focuses on annual
reports and corporation websites, such as Botosan (1997) stated "Although the annual
report is one means of corporate reporting, it should serve as a good proxy for the level
voluntary disclosure provided by a firm across all disclosure avenues. This is because
annual report disclosure levels are positively correlated with the amount of disclosure
provided via other media (Lang, and Lundholm, (1993)). The annual report is the focus of
my disclosure index because the annual report is generally considered to be one of the
most important sources of corporate information."(p.323).

Sub-independent variables:
Financial information transparency (FIT): there are three sub-variables under FIT
(ownership structure and investor relations, financial transparency 'and information

disclosure, and Board and management structure and process):
1. Ownership structure and investor relations (OSIR): Understanding the

ownership- structure of the company is essential, especially when there is a
known majority holder or when the majority holdings may exist ontthe basis of
collusive shareholding arrangements. Similarly, the existence of a large number
of nominee shareholders will make any analysis of the concentration of share
ownership difficult. The researcher defined ownership structure and investor
relations in this study as: the number of transparency criteria of ownership and
investor's relations / total numbers of transparency criteria of ownership and
investor's relations.
2. Financial transparency and information disclosure (FTID): Transparency

involves the timely disclosure of adequate information concerning a company's
operating and financial performance and its corporate governance practice. For
a well-governed company, standards of timely disclosure and transparency are
high. The researcher defined FTID in this study as: the number of transparency
criteria of financial transparency and information disclosure / total number of
transparency criteria of financial transparency and information disclosure.
3. Board and management structure and process (BMSP): Board structure and

process addresses the role of the corporate Board and its ability to provide
independent oversight of management performance and hold management
accountable to shareholder and other relevant stakeholders. The researcher
defined BMSP in this study as: the number of transparency criteria of Board and
management structure and process 1 total number of transparency criteria of

Board and management structure and process.

Dependent Variable
Investor Behavior:

Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) developed the seminal theory for the prediction of
human behavior intentions. This theory integrates physiological, psychological, and
behavioral systems. They explained their reasoned action model in that humans often
organize their behavior by intention (the original determination in their mind) and
transfer this determination to their action. Donaldsom and Davis (1994) extended the
reasoned action model to apply to business. They asserted that there is a positive
relationship between corporate performance and investor behavior. In support of reasoned
action theory, Uddin and Gillett, (2002) explained that corporate attitudes and investor
attitudes are expected to be strongly correlated. A positive corporate attitude will directly
motivate investors' attitudes as well as affect their behavior and actions in the stock
market. Negative corporate attitudes may lead investors to reconsider a stock's inclusion
in their portfolios.
According to these definitions of each variable above, the research design will
include an appropriate closed-end 1 to 9 Likert scale of survey questions to evaluate the
relationships among the variables. These variables will be measured using an Investment
Behavior Questionnaire, developed by the researcher.

Procedure

All procedures of this study were described in explicit terms so that other
researchers will be able to replicate the study. For this study, the researcher defined the
research questions to be answered, and than designed an appropriate questionnaire to
measure all of the variables. The content validity of the questionnaire will be based on a
review of relevant literature, and incorporation of ideas from dissertation committee
members.
The criterion for selection in this study is that only the respondents who have
previous experience with buying shares in TSEC will be included in this survey.
Participation in this survey was completely voluntary. Participants could withdraw from
the survey at any time without specifying the reasons. The aim of this survey was to help
the researcher to identify the critical factors that may explain the impact of financial
information transparency on investor behavior in Taiwan Stock Exchange.
The research study employed the following procedures to conduct this
investigation:

1. This research used closed-end questions with 1 to 9 Likert scale response
designed for every question in the questionnaire. Survey instructions to
participants were as follows: In answering all of the questions, the respondents
were requested to use a scale from 1 to 9 where 1 means" very strongly
disagree", 5 means "neither agree nor disagree", and 9 means "very strongly
agree". Write a number in the space provided that best indicates respondents'
feeling about the question.

2. The research includes one open-ended question, at the end of questionnaire, to

ensure that respondents had the full opportunity to express their comments and
suggestions for this survey.
3. As all respondents were Chinese, the questionnaire was translated from English
into Chinese by using the reverse-translation method with an official
endorsement from an expert who is fluent in both the Chinese and English
languages to ensure the consistency of the questionnaire. ?'he certificate letter
for the translation of questionnaire is provided.

4. Current research protocols require that all dissertation designs must be
approved by the University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) for research
concerning human subjects. After the study was approved by the Lynn
University Institutional Review Board (IRB), this survey was conducted with
investors in TSEC.
5. This survey selected investors from the stock market in Taiwan. This
questionnaire collected quantitative data from investors who have experience
with buying shares at TSEC in Taiwan.
6. The whole procedure of responding to this survey is totally anonymous. The

conduct of this survey took approximately one week, from December 12, 2005
to December 18,2005. There was no compensation offered to study volunteers.
This research intended to recruit a minimum of 300 participants, based on the
principle that a valid statistical analysis will need to look for about 5 to 10
responses in each of the major sub-categories of the sample for this study.

7. After getting all responses from participants, the researcher developed a
database structure which integrated the data for this study. The researcher will

keep all theinformation that participants provided completely confidential.
8. The statistical techniques for data analysis include descriptive, correlation,

independent sample t-test, one-way ANOVA analysis, and multiple regression
analyses. For this study, the level of confidence indicating statistical
significance was p

.05. The procedures were as follows: (1) the data was

analyzed in a standard SPSS statistical program and a simple descriptive
analysis was run. (2) the study used correlation analysis to examine the
relationship between variables. (3) multiple regression analysis was used to
interpret relationships among variables.

9. Finally, the researcher will interpret and discuss the results of all the data
analyses, and make conclusions and recommendations for the study.

Ethics
E h c a l behavior in educational research is in large part a personal matter, and
researchers have the ethical responsibility to protect the anonymity of participants
(Creswell, 2002). Babbie (1991) stated "the fundamental ethical rule of social research is
that it brings no harm to research subjects." (p.38).
In this study, the survey was distributed by the researcher to those who have
previous experience with investing or buying shares in companies listed on the Taiwan
Stock Exchange. In order to address ethical issues, a brief introduction was included in
the beginning of the questionnaire to explain the purpose of this research to participants,
and offer respondents an extended opportunity to ask questions.
The potential participants were approached by the researcher outside of an

underwriter's office and were provided with an explanation of the research. If they were
interested in participating, they were provided an Informed Consent letter, and
questionnaire. By completing the survey, the participant gave their consents. When the
survey was completed by the participants, the researcher collected the questionnaires. The
participants did not write any identifier on the questionnaire and no one can identify the
respondents from this survey. Participation in this survey was totally voluntary, they
could stop answering the questions or withdraw in the survey at any time. The whole
process of participation in this survey was completely anonymous and voluntary. A
participant was not requested to mention or write hisher name on the questionnaire.
Therefore, there is no way for the researcher to know who provided the responses. The
whole procedure was to guarantee respondents' anonymity and they were free to
discontinue participation at any time.
In this survey, human rights and data protection regulation are guaranteed by the
researcher. Confidentiality of survey data will be maintained and stored in the
researcher's personal database pool. The data will be saved no longer than one year from
when the study is completed and no one can access the researcher's personal database
pool except the researcher.

Instrumentation

Introduction
One instrument was used for the collection of the questionnaire data: The Investor
Behavior Questionnaire, which includes a demographic profile (see Appendix A),

developed by the researcher. There were a total of 20 questions. An Information and

,

Informed Consent Statement for Participants also explained the purpose of the study and
the aim of this survey to potential participants. The researcher conducted this survey
using a sample of investors who have previous experience with buying shares in TSEC.
The demographic profile portion of the questionnaire was constructed by the
researcher, and was intended to provide background information on each individual in the
study. The questionnaire asked for information such as: age, gender, and highest level of
education. The demographic statistics enabled the researcher to examine the impact of
demographic characteristics of the investors on their investment behavior. A survey with
a closed-ended 1 to 9 Likert scale questionnaire was developed and employed to rate the
impact of an information transparency on investor behavior.

Rationale of Selecting Instrument
Baker (1999) explained survey research as: "a research method that analyzes the
responses of defined sample to a set of questions measuring attitudes and behaviors."
(p.505). Babbie (1991) identified that a survey design is to provide a quantitative or
numeric description of attitudes, opinions, or trends of a population by investigating a
sample of the population. Surveys represent one of the most common types of
quantitative, social science research. The objective of a survey is to employ
questionnaires or interviews to gather data from a sample that has been chosen to
demonstrate a population to which the findings of the data analysis may be generalized
(Anderson & Kanuka, 2003).
The major benefit of survey research is that it presents all subjects with a
standardized stimulus, and can eliminate to a large degree unreliability in the researcher's

observations (Anderson & Kanuka, 2003). On the other hand, the disadvantage of survey
research is that researchers must develop questions general enough for all respondents.
However, it is not possible to deal with the context, under which the respondents make
their choices (Babbie 1991).

Development of the Questionnaire

Questionnaires are employed widely in educational research to gather data about
phenomena that are not easily observable. Dillman (2000) explained that when designing
a survey, a researcher has to make decisions such as whether they would like to employ
an oral or written method, and whether they prefer open or close-ended questions.
Questionnaire methodology is to ask the same questions to all participants in the sample.
Participants write down a response to each questionnaire item (Babbie 1991). In this
study, the researcher will employ a questionnaire method and choose close-ended
questions along with one open-ended question.
The purpose of writing a survey is to develop a written set of questions for the
respondents, and make every participant interpret these questions in the same way
(Babbie 1991). Researchers need to be careful with regard to the type, content, wording,
and order of the questions that are included in a questionnaire (Dillman, 2000).
There are several reasons for the researcher to select a questionnaire type of
survey design in this study.

1. The cost of survey questionnaires is relatively lower than through a one-to -one
interview process.
2. Standardized questions can help the researcher make precise measurements and

results which are easy to interpret by statistical analysis.
3. The time required to gather the data is less than resorting to the interview

technique.

4. Many questions can be asked about a given topic and a large sample size is
possible.
Many factors need to be considered when creating a questionnaire. This research
followed four procedures (determine the questions to ask, select the question format,
design the wording of questions, determine the order of questions), proposed by Fong
(2004), to build a valid questionnaire instrument:
1. Determine the Questions to Ask: The aim of this study was to investigate the

critical factor of financial information transparency that effects investor
behavior in the Taiwanese Stock Exchange. This study was interested in
analyzing investor attitudes and perceptions about information transparency
using a classic reasoned action theory approach. The questions helped this
research study to successhlly obtain the answers of its research inquiries. In
addition, questions should be precise, and not ambiguous in order to receive
specific feedback from participants. Therefore, this questionnaire was expected
to complete the purpose of this study.

2. Select the Question Format: A questionnaire can be either open form or closed
form. It depends on the objective of the question. The researcher decided to use
closed-ended questions with a 1 to 9 Likert scale response for each question in
the questionnaire. In this research also was included one open-ended question at
the end of survey to collect qualitative data. There are three techniques

.

employed in designing the questionnaire, there are closed-ended question, 1 to 9
Likert scale, and one open-ended question. The purpose of selecting this
questionnaire format was to obtain a wider range of replies from participants. .

3. Design the wording of questions: The general rule is to keep questions as
simple and straightforward as possible (Fong, 2004). The researcher also
considered the following rules to create the wording of questions: (1) avoid
biased or leading questions, (2) avoid double-barreled questions, (3) avoid
questions involving confusion, ambiguity, and negatives, (4) avoid questions
involving personal privacy, and (5) avoid asking questions that are beyond the
scope of the study.
4. Determine the Order of Questions: Burgess (2001) stated that questionnaires
should be kept logical and short. Illogically-ordered and longer questionnaires
may result in lower response rates. In this research, the researcher kept the
questionnaires logical, short, and easy for respondents. The purpose of this
design is to improve response rates by easy-to -answer

formats and

respondent-friendly questionnaire. The researcher also arranged similar
questions together for participants replying to the questionnaire. Additionally, in
order to avoid participants feeling uncomfortable with providing personal
information to strangers at first, the researcher placed demographic questions
near the end of the questionnaire.

Construction of the Questionnaire

The survey used for this study is based on the Reasoned Action Theory. The
questionnaire included an Information and Informed Consent Statement and an Investor
Behavior Questionnaire developed by the researcher (see Appendix A). The Information
and Informed Consent Statement includes a brief explanation of the objective of the
survey, the confidentiality of respondents' infornlation, and instructions on completing
the survey. The researcher's personal contact information was offered to assure
respondents that they could ask questions or request further information about this
research study.
The questionnaire is composed of 20 questions. Questions 1 to 14 pertained
directly to the influence of three elements (financial information transparency, social
responsibility and investor behavior) in the Taiwan Stock Market. There are a total of
nine questions for financial information transparency and disclosure, one question for
corporate social responsibility and four questions for investor behavior. Questions 11 to
14 are designed to survey investor behavior of the sample. Questions 15 to 19 are

directed to the participants' demographic information, such as: gender, age, education
level, attending stock market experience, and annual income. The last question is an
open-ended question. It allowed respondents to write down additional comments, and
suggestions, and any relevant issues that were not mentioned in the questionnaire. The
questions were divided as follows:
Transparency of Ownership questions: 1,2, and 3.
Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure questions: 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , and 8.

'

Board Structure and Process question: 9.
Corporate Social Responsibility question: 10.
Corporate Scandals questions: 11, 12, and 13.
Government Regulatory question: 14.
Demographic questions: 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19.

An open-ended question: 20.

Response Rate
The research study process requires a high participation rate in a sample selected
from a population to assure the possibility that bias is less likely. The following strategies
were conducted to enhance the response rate for this study:
1. Meeting with an expert to enhance the validity of the questionnaire.

2. Make sure all questions avoid problems with wording.
3. Ensure questions are easy and clear for participants to answer.

4. Employ the convenience sampling method to select the sample.

5. Visit local underwriters and institutions agencies to encourage they invite
participants to join k s survey.

Reliability and Validity
Backer (1999) stated that reliability has to build upon the accuracy and quality of
measurement. Therefore, the issue of reliability deals with the question of whether this
instrument will design the same finding each time the survey is processed to the same
participants in the same situation. However, Borg and Gall (1983) stated validity means

"in testing, the appropriateness, meaningfulness, and usehlness of specific inferences
made from test scores." (p.733). Therefore, validity is concerned about the study's
achievement in measuring what the researcher set out to measure and reliability is
concerned about the precision of the actual measuring or procedure instrument.
This study employed the following strategies to ensure the reliability and validity
of this research.

1. Quantitative research method: This research is conducted through a quantitative
research method to create the reliability and validity of the study. The results in
a quantitative research method are based on large sample sizes. Therefore this
research used a large enough sample of participants to provide meaningful data
that rely on statistical procedures.

2. A questionnaire type of survey: This study utilized a structural research
instrument - a questionnaire type of survey to enhance the reliability and
validity of the study. A questionnaire survey can be asked about a specified
topic in many questions. This type of survey provides great flexibility to the
researcher in the data analysis.

3. Work with dissertation committee members: The researcher worked with the
dissertation chair and committee members who are the experts in this topical
area to ensure the validity of the study. The researcher edited the study
questionnaire by meeting with the dissertation chair prior to the study. A
meeting with an expert helped the researcher to develop better questions and
adapt questions for final participants to answer.

Another method used to ensure the reliability of this study was to conduct a rating
format in the design of the questionnaire. The researcher used a survey questionnaire with
a closed-ended 1 to 9 Likert scale to ask participants the extent to which they agree or
disagree. Each question was designed to illicit a numerical value fiom 1 to 9. The
researcher's bias was eliminated through a standardized format that is presented to all
respondents. Higher reliability also could be obtained fiom this standardized format.

Population and Sampling Plan
Target andAccessible Population

A sample population is used due to researchers being unable to access all
members of the population. Investigating an entire population who are associated with a
study is almost impossible. Sometimes this kind of problem is due to limitations in time,
money or other resources (Babbie, 2002; Black, 1999).
Certain sampling methods are designed to increase the validity of study findings.
Researchers had to ensure that a large percentage of the chosen sample population will
respond. On the other hand, the statistical significance of the relationships among the
variables may be higher if the researchers have a high participation rate in a sample
selected from a population.
In this study, the target population was investors who have experience buying
shares of companies listed on TSEC. There are approximately 3 million investors trading
securities in the TSEC. The accessible population was limited to investors prior to their
entry into the security brokers and dealers. This study employed the convenience
sampling method to select the sample. Respondents were selected by a random sampling

method. The reason to select this sampling,method in the study is: the convenience
sampling method is the most economical, time-efficient, and feasible method for the
researcher. On the other hand, the random sampling method can increase the validity of
this study but also can avoid the bias by researchers (Creswell, 2002).

Eligibility Criteria

The main purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of financial information
transparency on investor behavior in Taiwan. For that reason, the eligibility criteria for
this study are:
1.

The geographic area and setting was limited to a public area, near the
entrance to one underwriter in Taiwan.

2.

Investors agreed to participate in this study and to complete a
questionnaire.

3.

Investors were able to read, write, and speak Chinese, were 18 years or
older.

4.

Investors must have had experience investing in the TSEC.

5.

The questionnaire was translated from English into Chinese by using
the reverse-translation method with an official endorsement from an
expert who is fluent in both the Chinese and English languages to
ensure the consistency of the questionnaire.

Systematic Sample (Probability)

The sample was selected from investors who have experience in TSEC, using
systematic sampling, a probability sampling plan. The using of systematic sampling is
commonly used in research in which large populations are studied. Systematic sampling
is "sampling in which individuals are selected from a list by taking every K name" (Gay,
1996. p. 122). The process of systematic sampling of subjects was choosing investors who
departed the underwriter as they finished their businesses.
Data Collection

A questionnaire was used to collect data from those who have previous experience
with buying shares in corporations listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Quantitative
data was collected using 19 closed-ended questions with 1 to 9 Likert scales, ranging
from very strongly disagree to very strongly agree (I = very strongly disagree, 5= neither
agree nor disagree, 9= very strongly agree). Before conducting the survey, meeting with

an expert helped to improve the reliability and validily of the questionnaire. This research
study planned to recruit 300 respondents to participate in the survey. The researcher
selected investors from those who registered with the underwriters in Taiwan. This
questionnaire collected quantitative data from investors who have experience with buying
shares at TSEC and at least 18 years old in Taiwan. The researcher stood outside of the
underwriter office to look for investors who met the requirements and were willing to be
a participant. After obtaining replies from the respondents, the researcher created a
database file that integrated the variables for the study, and then entered the collected data
into an SPSS statistical program.

Data Analysis
Introduction

The study used statistical methods to analyze the impact of financial information
transparency and corporate governance on investor behavior. This research followed five
major steps, proposed by Fong (2004), in the conduct of a study:
1. Structuring the data for analysis and validity measurement

2. Verifying the data
3. Describing the data (descriptive statistics)

4. Determining the relationships between variables (correlation analysis)
5. Examining the relationship among the independent variables and dependent

variable (multiple regression analysis)
Following the above steps, data was collected and entered into an SPSS program.
for statistical analysis. Reliability was determined by Cronbach's Alpha (a) Reliability.
Correlation analysis was used to determine the relationship between variables. If there is
a strong positive relationship between two variables the correlation coefficient will be
close to +l. 0, and if there is a strong negative relationship between two variables the
correlation coefficient will tend toward to -1. 0. Finally, this study employed a multiple
regression analysis to determine relationships among the variables. Multiple regression
analysis presents the important degree of influence of two or more independent variables
on a single dependent variable.

Methods of Data Analysis

Five different statistical analyses were used in this study (descriptive statistics,
correlation analysis, independent-samples t-test analysis, one-way ANOVA analysis,
multiple regression analysis).

1. Descriptive statistics: Descriptive statistics are designed to achieve information
concerning the distribution of variables (Creswell, 2002). After data was
collected, the researcher ran the sample descriptive statistics in a standard SPSS
program to interpret the validity on data status in this study. The frequency
distribution of discrete variables (gender, level of education, buying shares
experience, and annual income) was checked by the researcher. Further, the
frequency distribution of continuous independent and dependent variables was
analyzed with histograms.
2. Correlation analysis: Correlation analysis was used to develop a simple
correlation between two continuous variables (Creswell, 2002). The researcher
employed correlation analysis to examine the relationships between the
independent variables to ensure that all independent variables are independent
of each other. The researcher also conducted correlation analysis to examine the
relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable to
measure whether the research questions in this study are supported.
3. Independent samples t-test analysis: The t-test is used to compare the values of

the means from two different samples. A t-test determines if the means of the

two sample distributions vary significantly from each other (Creswell, 2002). In
this study, independent sample t-test analysis was used to examine the

independent and dependent variables to determine whether there is a different
tendency among participants according to the demographic variable of gender.
4. One-way ANOVA analysis: One-way ANOVA analysis is designed to measure

the relationship between one dependent variable and multiple independent
variables. This is different .from the t-test analysis which compares only two
distributions. One-way ANOVA analysis can compare two or more independent
variables (Creswell, 2002). In this study, one-way ANOVA analysis was
employed to examine whether there are any statistical differences between
diverse experience groups in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Experience was
divided into three groups: less than 4 years, 4-9 years, and more than 9 years,
which were coded numerically as 1, 2, and 3. In one-way ANOVA analysis,
the researcher explored whether there are significant differences within any of
the comparisons of the three groups in the sample.
5. Multiple regression analysis: Regression analysis is designed to measure a

linear relationship between variables. It can be used to calculate the values of a
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. The results
presented by multiple regression analysis are four main values:

R2:
The R value indicates the strength of the relationship between the dependent
variable and independent variables. The square of R indicates the extent of the
variance of the dependent variable that is explained by the set of independent
variables. The R value ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, 0.0 means no relationship. The
larger the value of R, the better (Creswell, 2002).

F statistic: The F statistic represents a probability value that the relationship

between the dependent variable and the set of independent variables could have
happened by chance (Creswell, 2002).
Beta weight: The Beta weight indicates the unique contribution of each
independent variable to explain the dependent variable. Beta weight is similar to
a correlation coefficient and the value ranges from -1 to $1. Generally spealung,
the beta weight represents the direction and the strength of the relationship
between the dependent and independent variables (Creswell, 2002).
t statistic: The t statistic indicates the degree of probability of the relationship
between each independent variable and dependent variable (Creswell, 2002). In
this study, multiple regression analysis was used to examine the relationships
between the independent and dependent variables.
In this study, the regression equation takes the form as below:

Y=~(XI,X~,X~,&,XS,X~,X~,X~)+~
Where Y = Investor Behavior (Dependent variable)

XI= OSIR (Independent Variable I), ownership structure and investor
relations.

X2

=

FTID (Independent Variable 2), financial transparency and

information disclosure.

X3 = BMSP (Independent Variable 3), board and management structure
and process.
Xq = Gender (Independent Variable 9)

Xs=Age (Independent Variable 10)
X6= Education (Independent Variable 11)

X7 = Annual income (Independent Variable 12)
X8 = Experience (Independent Variable 13)
e = error term

Summary
This chapter presents a description of the methodology for this study, whlch
focuses on the impact of financial information transparency on investor behavior in the
Taiwan Stock Exchange. The five research questions led to the development of the survey
of this study with descriptive and exploratory purposes. The research design employed a
non-experimental, causal-comparative, quantitative method approach. There are 8
independent variables and 1 dependent variable in this study. The survey uses 19
closed-ended and one open-ended question in the survey instrument.
The statistical techniques for data analysis included descriptive statistics,
correlation analysis, independent sample t-test, one-way ANOVA analysis, and multiple
regression analysis. A multiple regression analysis was employed to examine the
relationship among independent and dependent variables. The R square value was used to
examine the significance of the overall model. The results of this study can make a
significant contribution to the development of effective corporate governance on investor
behavior in the Taiwan Stock Exchange.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Introduction

The purpose of this study was to demonstrate how financial information
transparency factors affect investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. The major
independent variable was financial information transparency. Sub-variables for the
independent variable financial information transparency included ownership structure,
financial transparency, and board structure. Demographic variables were gender, age,
education, and income. The last independent variable was investing experience. The
dependent variable was investor behavior.
The research conducted a quantitative method approach, using closed-end
questions on survey instruments. Participants were instructed to indicate how strongly
they disagreed or agreed with a number of their descriptors and feelings about the impact
of financial information transparency on investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. A
nine point Likert scale was used in the survey (1 = very strongly disagree, 5 neither agree
nor disagree, 9 = very strongly agree). The survey was distributed by the researcher to
investors who have experience with buying shares in the Taiwan stock market. Data was
collected during December of 2005. A total of 305 responses were received by the
deadline. In general, the study's results indicate the inference of relationships between
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market.
This chapter presents the major results assessed from the data collection. Chapter
four begins with descriptive characteristics of the participants. 'These findings support the
purpose of the study to answer and test the following research questions and hypothesis

investigated:
Research Questions
1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock
Market?
2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of
financial information transparency according to demographic variables?
3. Are there difference in TSEC investor behavior according to different
categories of investor experience?
Hypothesis

H: TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions,
investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC.
Research methods of data analysis included the descriptive statistic, correlation
analysis, independent-samples t tests analysis, one-way ANOVA analysis, and multiple
regression analysis (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2005; SPSS Inc. 2005).

Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents
A sample survey in the Taiwan stock market was obtained with an " N count of
305. Of the respondents, gender was divided somewhat evenly with 158 (51.8%) males,
and 147 (48.2%) females. The mean age group for those respondents in the survey was
2.78 with a standard deviation of 0.87 for four age groups (18-30, 31-45, 46-60, more
than 60), while 5.6% were between 18 to 30 years old. The median age group was 3. The

age ranged from 46-60 yeas of age. Figure 2 shows the age distribution of samples in this
study.
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Figure 2: The age distribution of samples in this study.

The divisions of the educational background of respondents were as follows:

A total of 94 respondents (30.8%) had a high school degree or under, 105 (34.4%)
had a two years college degree, 70 (23%) had a bachelor degree, and 36 (11.8%) had a
masters degree or above. Figure 2 shows the educational background distribution of
samples in this study.
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Figure 3: The educational background distribution of samples in this study.

The division of income for respondents was as follows:

A total of 69 respondents (22.6%) had a less than 10,000 USD, 107 (35.1%) had
10,000 to 25,000 USD, 63 (20.7%) had 25,001 to 35,000 USD, and 66 (21.6%) had more
than 35,000 USD. Figure 3 shows the annual income distribution of responses in this
study.
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Figure 4: The income distribution of responses in this study.

Research Question 1
Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock Market?

In order to answer the research question 1, two different statistical analyses were
employed. They were descriptive analysis and correlation analysis.

Descriptive Analysis for Questions I
The report of frequencies count concerning independent variables (i.e., ownership
structure, financial transparency, board structure) showed that financial transparency had
the highest mean score of 4.813 (SD

=

1.074). Board structure had the second.highest

mean score of 4.472 (SD =1.886). Ownership structure had the lowest mean score of
4.031 (SD

=

1.268). The dependent variable of investor behavior had a mean score of

4.617 (SD =1.714). Table 1 below displays the basic descriptive data of ownership

structure, financial transparency, board structure, and investor behavior.
Table I
The Results of Frequencies Ccount for Investor Behavior and Three Independent
Variables (Ownership Structure, Financial Transparency, Board Structure) N=305
Std. Error of
Median
Mode
Std.
Mean
Variable
Mean
Deviation
Ownership
4.03 1
.073
4.00
3.50
1.268
Structure

Financial
Transparency

4.813

.061

4.75

5.52

1.074

Board
Structure

4.472

.lo8

5.00

5.00

1.886

Investor
Behavior

4.617

.098

4.33

4.33

1.714

CorrelationAnalysis for Question I

Correlations analysis was conducted using the Pearson Product Moment
technique for three continuous independent variables (ownership structure, financial
transparency, board structure) and one continuous dependent variable (investor behavior).
The purposes of doing the correlation analysis for research question 1 are that correlation
analysis can measure if three independent variables (ownership structure, financial
transparency, board structure) are independent fiom each other and correlation analysis
can measure if each independent variable has high correlation coefficient with the
dependent variable (investor behavior).
As shown in Table 2, all of the correlation coefficients are lower than 35. If the
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correlation coefficient is higher than 35, they the variables are not independent from each
other.

Therefore, the three independent variables (ownership structure, financial

transparency, board structure) were independent fiom each other.

,

Table 2
The Results of Pearson Correlation Coeficients among the ~nde~enden't
Variablq
(Ownership Structure, Financial Transparency, Board Structure) N=305 . .
Variable
Ownership
Financial
Board
Structure
Transparency
Structure
Ownership
1
.430**
.797**
Structure(~earson
Correlation)
Financial (Pearson Correlation)
Transparency

.430**

Board (Pearson Correlation)
.797**
Structure
*p = < .05 **p = < .01 ***p =< .001

1

.432**

.432**

1

A correlation coefficient is a number that indicates the degree of relationship
between variables. The value of the correlation coefficient ranges from -1.0 to +1.0. A
positive correlation (1 > r > 0) means two variables have a positive relationship. On the
other hand, a negative correlation (-1 < r < 0) means two variables have negative
relationship. As shown in Table 3, the coefficients are positive (1 .> r > 0) and are
statistically significant different at p

=

<.01 level between independent variables

(ownership structure, financial transparency, board structure) and investor behavior in the
Taiwan stock market.

The Results of Pearson Correlation Analysis for Investor Behavior and Independent
Variables (Ownership Structure, Financial
Transparency, Board Structure) N-305
Variable
Ownership
Financial
Board
Structure
Transparency
Structure
.
Investor Behavior
(Pearson Correlation)

.837**

.632**

.848**

In general, investor behavior had a strong positive correlation to the independent
variables (ownership structure, financial transparency, board structure). The correlation
between investor behavior and independent variables was statistically significant at the p
=

< .O1 level, which means they had a strong positive relationship. This number

represents that as the value of one independent variable increases, the value of the
dependent variable (investor behavior) also tends to increase. This result illustrates that
corporations enhancing ownership structure, financial transparency, and board structure
can improve relationships with investors.

Research Question 2
Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of financial
information transparency according to demographic variables? In order to answer
research question 2, descriptive statistics, independent-samples t test analysis and
ANOVOA were utilized. The independent-samples t test can compare the means of two
different groups such as females and males. ANOVA can compare three or more groups
in the study.

Descriptive and Independent-Sample t Test Analysis for Question 2

The data sample consists of 305 respondents who completed the survey; including
158 (51.8%) males, and 147 (48.2%) females. Gender is a nominal variable. It was taken
on two values, males .and females in the survey, which were coded numerically as 1 and 2.
Table 4 displays the mean scores for males and females with regard to the financial
information transparency variables in this study. The table also displays the.results of the
two-tailed significant difference between males and females.
Table 4
The Result of Mean Scores and Independent-Sample t testfor Males and Females
Variable

Males (N=158)

Females (N=147)

t

Mean

Mean

(two-tailed)

5.316

4.273

9.67**

3.217

14.59**

Ownership
Structure
Financial
Transparency

Board
5.639
Structure
*p = < .05 **p = < .01 ***PI< .001

The results indicated that among financial information transparency elements, all
of the elements had significant difference between males and females. In ownership
structure, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that the 158 males had a mean
of 4.51 5; the females had a mean of 3.5 10 in the study, which had the score of mean
difference 1.005. The means differ significantly at the p < .O1 level (p =.000). In
financial transparency, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that the 158 males

had a mean of 5.316; the females had a mean of 4.273 in the study, which had the score
of mean difference 1.042. The means differ significantly at the p < .Ol level (p =.000). In
board structure, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that the 158 males had a
mean of 5.639; the females had a mean of 3.217 in the study, which had the score of
mean difference 2.42. The means differ significantly at the p < .O1 level (p =.000).
This finding indicated that males and females were significantly different from
each other in the elements (ownership sbxcture, financial transparency, and board
structure) of financial information transparency. This means that males were more
concerned with strong financial information transparency than females in the Taiwan
stock market. This result can help us understand that stock market investors who have
high-quality requirements for information transparency and disclosure, can take the
desire of improvement with financial information transparency in the Taiwan stock
market and start their investment strategy more easily with male investors.

ANOVA Analysis for Question 2

In this study, age was divided into four groups: 18-30 years, 31-45 years, 46-60
years, and more than 60 years, which were coded numerically as 1, 2, 3, and 4. Income
was divided into four groups: less than 10,000 USD, 10,000-25,000 USD, 25,001-35,000
USD, and over 35,000 USD. ANOVA analysis was used to examine whether there are
any statistical differences between diverse age groups and income groups in the financial
information transparency. Post Hoc tests include a Scheffe test to identify which groups
differ significantly from each other.

ANOVA Analysis in Ownership Structure According to Age Groups

According to the Table 5, there was no significant difference which existed among
the four groups at the .O1 level. The mean difference between each group also was not
statistically significant. There were no significant differences in the.ownership structure
of financial information transparency.. Table 6 displays descriptive.information of each
age group.
Table 5
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of Signzjkant Dzferences in Ownership
Structure According to Age Groups N=305
(1) Aee
(J)Aee
Mean Difference
Post Hoc Com~arisons
p Scheffe
p LSD
18-30 (N=17)
3 1-45
.263
46-60
.lo6
>60
.I91

As shown in Table 6 for descriptive information of each age group in ownership
structure. The mean of group 18-30 was 4.205 and 4.01 3 in group of over 60 years.

The Result of Descriptive Iformation of Each Age Group in Ownership Stnlcture
Age Groups

Mean

Std'
Deviation

Std. Error Minimum Maximum

ANOVA Analysis in Financial TransparencyAccording to Age Groups

Table 7 displays the result of ANOVA analysis for financial transparency. There
were no significant difference which existed among the four groups at the .O1 level. In
Table 8, the data indicate the four age groups did not have means which differed
significantly (p = < .05) from each other. According to Table 8, descriptive data, age
group 1 had the highest mean score (M = 5.029) in financial transparency. Age group 4
had the lowest mean score (M = 4.673) in financial transparency. The results indicated
that among the four age groups, age group 1 (18-30 years) were more concerned with
financial transparency in the Taiwan stock market. However, age group 4 (more than 60
years) paid less attention to financial transparency in the stock market.

The Result of ANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of Significant Dzfferences in Financial
TransparencyAccording to Age Groups N=305
(I)Age
(4Age
Mean Difference
Post Hoc Comparisons
p Scheffe
p LSD
18-3O(N=17)
31-45
.074
46-60
.290
>60
.355

As shown in Table 8 for descriptive information of each age group in financial
transparency. The mean of group 18-30 was 5.029 and 4.673 in group of over 60 years.
Table 8
The Result of Descriptive Information of Each Age Groupfor Financial Transparency

Mean

Std'
Deviation

Std. Error Minimum Maximum

ANOVA Analysis in Board Structure According to Age Groups

Table 9 displays the result of ANOVA analysis for board structure, p = .Q04,there
was significant difference which existed among the four groups. The asterisks (*) -indicate
there were two pairs of groups (group 2 and group 3, and group 2 and group 4) whose
means differ significantly O, = < .05) from each other. According to Table 10, descriptive
data, group 4 had the highest mean score (M = 4.875) in board structure. Group 4 also
had a mean differ significantly with group 2 (M = 3.990). The result indicates that among
four age groups, age group 4 (more than 60 years) paid more attention to the board
structure, information, and process with corporations.
Table 9

The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of SigniJicantDifferences in Board
Structure According to Age Groups N=305
(1) Age
(J) Age
Mean Difference
Post Hoc Comparisons
p Scheffe
p LSD
18-30 (Nx17)
31-45
.009
46-60
-.738
>60
-.875
31-45 (N=105) 18-30
-.009
46-60
-.748*
.003
>60
-.884*
.002
46-60 (N=lll) 18-30
.738
31-45
.748*
.003
>60
-.I36
.875
>60 (N=72)
18-30
31-45
.884*
.002
46-60
.I36

As shown in Table 10 for descriptive information of each age group in board
structure. The mean of group 18-30 was 5.029 and 4.673 in group of over 60 years.

.

,

The Reslrlt ofDescriptive Information of Each Age Groupfor Board Structure
.

~

Mean

Deviation

Std. Error Minimum ~ a x i m i m '

. . . ..

The final results represent that there was no effect for ownership structure and
financial transparency among the four age groups in the study. However, there were
significant differences existing among the four groups for board structure. Age group 1
(1 8-30 years) had more concern for financial transparency and information disclosure in
the Taiwan stock market. On the other hand, group 4 (more than 60 years) paid more
attention to the board structure, information, and process with corporations.

ANOVA Analysis in Ownership Structure According to Income Groups

In this study, individual annual income was divided into four groups: less than
-

10,00OUSD, 10,000-25,00OUSD, 25,001 -35,00OUSD, and more than 35,00OUSD, which
were coded numerically as 1,2,3, and 4. One-way ANOVA analysis was used to examine
whether there are any statistical differences between diverse income groups in the
financial information transparency. Post Hoc tests include a Scheffe test to identify which

groups differ significantly from each other.
According to the Table 11, there was a significant difference which existed among
the four groups at the .O1 level. Table 12, p

=

.000, the mean difference between each

group were also. statistically
.
significant. There were significant 'differences in the
ownership structure of financial information transparency. Table 12'displays descriptive
information of each income group. Group 4 (more than 35k) had the highest mean score :

(M = 4.674) and group 1 (less than 10k) had lowest mean score (M = 3.318). The result
indicates that higher income persons had more concern for ownership structure than
lower income persons.
Table 11
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of Significant Differences in Ownership
Structure According to Income Groups N=305
(I)Income
(J)Income
Mean Difference
Post Hoc Comparisons
p Scheffe
p LSD

Less thanlO~OOO 10,001-25,000
USD (N=69)
25,001-35,000
>35.000
10,000-25,000 Less
USD (N=107) than10,OOO

25,001-35,000
USD (N=63)

Over 35,000
USD(N=66)

Less
than10,000
10,001-25,000
>35.000
Less
than10,OOO

-.779*

.oo 1

.ooo

-.704*
-1.355"

.010
.OOO

.010
.OOO

.779*

.001

.ooo

.704*

.010

.001

-.074
-.650*

,023

.002

As shown in Table 12 for descriptive information of each income group in

:

ownership structure. The mean of the group less than 10,000 USD was 3.3 18 and 4.674
for the group of over 35,000 USD.
Table 12

The Result of Descriptive Information ofEach Income Groupfor Ownership Structure

Less than10,OOO
(N=69)

Over 35,000
(N=66)

Mean
3.3

4.674

Std'
Deviation

1.131

Std. Error Minimum Maximum

.I36

1.5

6.0

1.138

ANOVA Analysis in Financial TransparencyAccording to Income Groups
According to Table 13, there was a significant difference which existed among the
four groups at the .O1 level. Table 14, p = .000, the mean difference between each group
also were statistically significant. There were significant differences in the financial
transparency of financial information transparency. Table 14 displays descriptive
information of each income group. Group 4 (more than 35k) had the highest mean score

(M = 4.815) and group 1 (less than 10k) had lowest mean score (M = 3.617). The result
indicates that higher income persons paid more attention to financial transparency and
information disclosure than lower income persons in the stock market.

Table 13
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of SigniJicantDzfferences in Financial :
TransparencyAccording to Income Groups N=305
(I) Income
(J) Income
Mean Difference
Post Hoc Comparisons
Less UlanlOyOOO10,001-25,000
USD (N=69)

10,000-25,000
USD @=I 07)

Less
than10,OOO

25,001-35,000
USD (N=63)

Less
than10,OOO
10,001-25,000
>35,000
Less
than10,000

Over 35,000
USD(N=66)

p Scheffe

p LSD

-.748*

.000

.OOO

.748*

,000

.OOO

1.108*

.OOO

.OOO

.OOO

.OOO

.360
-.297
1.406%

Shown in Table 14 is the descriptive information of each income group in
financial transparency. The mean of the group less than 10,000 USD was 4.018 and 5.424
for the group of over 35,000 USD.

I

Table 14
The Result of Descriptive Information of Each Income Groupfor Financial Transparency
Std.
Mean
Std. Error Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Less than10,OOO
4.01 8
323
.099
1.7
5.7
(N=69)
io,ooo-zs,ooo
4.766
1.002
.096
2.0
6.5
(N=107)
5.127
25,001-35,000
1.029
.I29
1.7
7.0
(N=63)
Over 35,000
5.424
.943
.I16
3.0
7.0
(N=66)

ANOVA Analysis in Board Structure According to Income Groups
Table 15 displays the result of ANOVA analysis for board structure, p

=

.000.

There was a significant difference existing among the four groups. According to Table
16, descriptive data, group 4 had the highest mean score (M

=

5.666) than the other

groups in board structure. Group 1 had the lowest mean score (M = 3.3 18). The result
indicates that among four age groups, income group 4 (more than 35,000USD) paid more
attention to the board structure, information, and process.

Table 15
The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of SigniJicantDzfferences in Board
Structure According to Income Groups N=305
( I ) Income
(J) Income
Mean Difference
Post Hoc Comparisons
p Scheffe
p LSD
Less thanlO'OOO 10,001-25,000
USD (N=69)

10,000-25,000

USD (N=107)

Less
than10,OOO

25,001-35,000
USD (N=63)

Less
than10,OOO
10,001-25,000
>35,000
Over 35,000
Less
than10,OOO
USD(N=66)
10,001-25,000
25,001-35,000
F=21.039
p= .OOO
*p = < .05 **p = < .01 ***p = < .001

-1.083*

.001

.OOO

1.083*

.001

.OOO

1.284*

.001

.OOO

.201
-1.063*

.007

.001

2.347*

.OOO

.OOO

1.264*
1.063*

.OOO
.007

.OOO
.001

As shown in Table 16 for descriptive information of each income group in.board
structure. The mean of the group less than 10,000 USD was 3.318 and 5.666 for the
group of over 35,000 USD.

The Result ofDescriptive Information of Each Income Groupfor Board Structure

Less than10,OOO
(N=69)
10,000-25,000
(N=l07)
25,001-35,000
(N=63)
Over 35,000
(N=66)

Mean
3.318

4.401
4.603
5.666

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error Minimum Maximum

1.429

.I72

1.O

7.0

1.725

.I66

1.O

9.0

2.067

.260

1.O

9.0

1.639

.201

2.0

9.0

The final results show that there is an effect for financial information transparency
among the four income groups in the study. Therefore, there were significant differences
which existed among the four income groups for ownership structure, financial
transparency and board structure. Income group 4 (more than 35,000USD) had more
concern about financial transparency and information disclosure in the Taiwan stock
market. On the other hand, group 1 (less than 10,000USD) paid less attention to the
financial information transparency in a stock market, especially in the ownership
structure with corporations.

Research Question 3

Are there differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different categories
of investor experience? In order to answer research question 3, two statistical analyses
were employed. They were descriptive statistics and ANOVA analysis.

ANOVA Analysis for Question 3

In this study, the number of years of investing experience was divided into three
groups: less than 4 years, 4-9 years, and more than 9 years, which were coded
numerically as 1, 2, and 3. ANOVA analysis was used to examine whether there are any
statistical differences between diverse investing experience groups in the investor
behavior. Post Hoc tests include a Scheffe test and LSD test to identify between which
groups differ significantly from each other.

ANOVA Analysis in Investor BehaviorAccording to Experienced Groups

According to the Table 17, (p = .507) there were no significant difference existing
among the three groups at the .01 level. The mean difference between groups also was
not statistically significant. There were no significant differences in investor behavior
with investing experience. Table 18 displays descriptive information of each investing
experience group.

The Result ofANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons of SigniJicanl Dzfferences in Investor
Behavior According to Experienced Groups N=305
(I
Experienced
)

(J) Experienced

Mean
Difference

Post Hoc Comparisons
D Scheffe

Less than 4 years
(N=39)

4-9 years

4-9 years(N=96)

More than 9 vears
Less than 4 years
More than 9 vears

-.352
.251
-.100

More than 9 years
(N=170)

Less than 4 years

.352

4-9 years
F=.68
p= .507
* p = < .05 **p = < .01 ***p = < .001

D

LSD

.lo0

As shown in Table 18 for descriptive information of each income group in
investor behavior. The mean of the group less than 4 years was 4.341 and 4.694 for the
group of more than 9 years.
Table 18
The Result of Descriptive Information of Each Investing Experience Groupfor Investor
Behavior
Mean

Std'
Deviation

Std. Error Minimum Maximum

Less than 4
years
(N=39)

4.341

1.298

.207

1.3

8.0

More than 9
years
(N=170)

4.694

1.841

.I41

1.O

9.0

The final results represent that the number of years of investing experience does
not affect investor behavior among the three investing experience groups in the study.
Therefore, there were no significant differences existing among the three groups for
investor behavior. - -

Hypothesis

Hypothesis: -TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency
dimensions, investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC. Multiple regression analysis was used to test
whether there are any statistical differences among variables in the TSEC investor
perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions.

Multiple Regression Analysis for Hypothesis Testing
Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between
socio-demographic variables (gender, age, income, education level), financial
transparency variables (ownership structure, financial transparency, board structure), and
experience variable and the dependent variable of investor behavior. As shown in Table
20, the F value (62.37) for the overall regression equation was significant (p=.000). The
adjusted R square indicated the regression equation using the independent variables
explain 55% (54.8) of the variation in investor behavior. In terms of relative importance
of these predictors, based on the values of the beta

(P)

coefficients, the order of

importance was board structure @=.894), age @=-.870), ownership structure @=.837),
financial transparency @=.632), education @=.469), gender @=-.41 I), income @=.081),,
and experience @=.042).
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As reported, the hypothesis that TSEC investor perceptions of financial
information transparency dimensions, investor demographic, and investor experience are
significant explanatory variables of investor of investor behavior in the TSEC was
partially supported.
Table 19
Multiple Regression of Investor Behavior
Explanatory
b

SE

t

BETA(@

P

-1.407

.I60

-8.807

-.411

.OOO

Education

309

.077

10.496

.469

Income

.I30

.078

1.671

.081

.004

Experience

.lo2

.lo3

.990

.042

.555

1.132

.042

26.275

237

.OOO

312

.023

34.711

.894

.OOO

Variable

Gender

.

.OOO

Financial
Transparency
Ownership Structure
Financial
Transparency
Board Structure
N=305
F=62.37
df=8

p<.000

R2=.557

Adjusted R2=.548

A regression analysis can determine the effect of a set of independent variables on
the dependent variable. Investor behavior was the dependent variable in this study. A
111

regression analysis of the set of independent variables results in an R2 = .557. The score
for R square was statistically significant at the .O1 level. The result represents that this
study has an appropriate set of independent variables to predict the dependent variable.
According to the score of R square, the independent variables account for 55.7% of the
variation of the dependent variable. The remaining 44.3% of the variation of the
dependent variable is due to other variables not included in this study. In general, there
was a moderately strongly relationship between investor behavior and independent
variables (ownership structure, financial transparency, board structure).
According to the Beta @), board structure had the most important effect on
investor behavior, which was 394 at the .O1 level of significance. The analysis represents
that board structure was a significant predictor for investor behavior. The findings of this
analysis are that the independent variables (ownership structure, financial transparency,
board structure) have a moderately strong affect on investor behavior. That means
focusing on these independent variables is a positive strategy for corporations to increase
investment and activity in a stock market.

Estimates of Construct Validity Using Factor Analysis
Bryman & Crarner (1997) suggested that the greater value of Kaiser- MeyerOlkin (KMO) and not less than .5 will be accepted to do the factor analysis for construct
validity in a study. Stevens (1992) suggested that if the samples of the survey are over
250, the value of KMO should be above .6. As shown in Table 20, the KMO was .758
and significant.

Table 20

KMO and Bartlettk Test of Distribute on Investor Behavior
KMO
Chi-square
df

P

According to Figure 5 Scree Plot and Table 21 total variance explained, there are
four components extracted in the survey. Figure 5 Scree Plot showed after component
number 4 that the Scree becomes a smooth line. The extracted 4 components were
utilized for this questionnaire design. Table 28 Total Variance Explained presented that
only four components of Total Initial Eigenvalues value were over 1. Therefore,
Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings suggested extracted 4 components were
appropriate for this survey.
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Figure 5: Scree Plot.

Table 2 1
Total Variance Explained of Initial Eigenvalues on Questionnaire Design
,
Extraction Sums of Squared
Component
Initial Eigenvalues
Loadings
% of
Cumulative
Total
Total
%
cumulative %
%
Variance
Variance
1
3.593
28.237
28.237 3.593
28.237
28.237

According to Table 22 Rotated Component Matrix, the components allocation was
identical with the questionnaire which was designed by the researcher. Therefore, the
construct validity was identified by factor analysis.
Table 22

Rotated Component Matrix
Component

1

2

3

*Rotation Method: ~arirn&with ~ a i s e~ormafization
r

4

Estimates of Reliability Using Cronbach's Alpha

Nunnally (1978) and Devellis (1991) suggested that .7 of Cronbach's Alpha is the
minimum value acceptable in a survey. As shown in Table 23, the four dimensions for the
total scale resulted in good internal consistency, evidenced by an alpha of 28. In this
study, the 3 items ownership structure scale had an alpha of .72. The 5 items financial
transpafency scale had an alpha of .71. For the board structure scale, the alpha was 3 6 .
The last dimensions, investor behavior scale, had an alpha of 30.
Table 23
Cronbach b Alpha of the Four Dimensions Scale of Investor Behavior
Instrument (1V= 305)
Dimensions
Number of Items Cronbach's Alpha

Ownership Structure

3

.7180

Financial Transparency
Board Structure
Investor Behavior
Total Scale

Based on Table 23 all dimensions scale of Cronbach's Alpha were over .7. In
addition, the total scale of Cronbach's Alpha was 3816. Therefore, the instrument for this
study had good reliability.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, INTERPRETATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS,
LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE STUDY
Chapter five provides a final review of the study. The following sections are
included; the summary of the study, the interpretations of the findings, practical
implications of the findings, conclusions, the limitations of the study, and
recommendations for hture study.

Summary of the Study
Recent cases of accounting fraud, financial misstatements and poor corporate
governance have become widely publicized. However, the improvement of financial
information transparency may provide investors the opportunity to conduct their
investing strategy in the stock market. Investor behavior is the relationship between an
investor and a company, and the relationship needs to be managed. Therefore, the study
demonstrated a framework that is grounded in the financial information transparency
concepts of ownership structure, financial transparency, and board structure in order to
examine investor behavior.
This research addressed the following questions and hypothesis:
Research Questions

1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock
Market?

2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of
financial information transparency according to demographic variables?
3. Are there differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different
categories of investor experience?

Hypothesis
H: TSEC investor perceptions of financial information transparency dimensions,
investor demographic, and investor experience are significant explanatory
variables of investor behavior in the TSEC.
In order to answer the three research questions and test the hypothesis, the study
focused on eight independent variables and one dependent variable. The major
independent variable is financial information transparency, sub-variables for the
independent variable included ownership structure, financial transparency, and board
structure. Demographic independent variables included gender, age, education, and
income. The eighth independent variable is investing experience. The dependent variable
was investor behavior.
The research design used a quantitative method with 19 closed-ended questions,
and one open-ended question on the survey instrument. The questionnaire was scored on
a 9 point Likert scale (9 = very strongly agree, 5 = neither agree nor disagree, 1 = very
strong disagree). The study used a sample of investors who have previous investing
experience in the Taiwan stock market. Data was collected in a period of one week from
December 1 2 ' ~to December 18th of 2005. A total of 305 respondents (158 males and 147
females) completed the survey. Collected data was analyzed by SPSS windows version
13.0. Five different statistical analyses were employed for the survey. They were

descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, independent-sample t test analysis, one-way
ANOVA analysis, ai~dmultiple regression analysis.

Interpretations of Findings

Research Question 1
Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of dimensions of
financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan Stock Market?
Findings in question 1 reveal that investor behavior had a strong positive
correlation to the three financial information transparency elements (i.e., ownership
structure, financial transparency, and board structure) in the Taiwan stock market. Among
the three elements, board structure had the strongest relationship with investor behavior
in the study, which was r = 348 and the relationship was statistically significant (p = ,000)
at the p=< .O1 level. Generally, the results support the inference of financial information
transparency (ownership structure, financial transparency, and board structure) and
investor behavior relationship. The findings also supported the hypathesis.

Research Question 2
Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension of financial
information transparency according to demographic variables?
The independent-samples t test can compare the means of two different groups
such as males and females. The results show that among ownership structure, financial
transparency, and board structure, there were significant differences between males and
females in financial information transparency.

In ownership structure, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that the
158 males had a mean of 4.5 15; the females had a mean of 3.5 10 in the study, which had
the score of mean difference 1.005. The means differ significantly at the p < .O1 level (Is
=.000). In financial transparency, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that
the 158 males had a mean of 5.3 16; the females had a mean of 4.273 in the study, which
had the score of mean difference of 1.042. The means differ significantly at the p < .01
level (p =.000). In board structure, the independent-sample t test analysis indicated that
the 158 males had a mean of 5.639; the females had a mean of 3.217 in the study, which
had the score of mean difference of 2.42. The means differ significantly at the p < .O1
level (p =.000). Overall, the findings indicate that males were more concerned with
strong financial information transparency than females in the Taiwan stock market. The
findings also support the hypothesis.
ANOVA analysis was employed to examine whether there are any statistical
differences between different age groups in financial information transparency in the
stock market. Post Hoc tests include Scheffe test and LSD test to recognize which groups
differ significantly from each other. The final results represent that there was no effect
for ownership structure and financial transparency among four age groups in the study.
However, there were significant differences which existed among the four groups for
board structure. Age group 1 (18-30 years) had more concern about financial
transparency and information disclosure in the Taiwan stock market. On the other hand,
group 4 (more than 60 years) paid more attention to the board structure, information, and
process with corporations. The findings also supported the hypothesis.

ANOVA analysis was used to examine whether there are any statistical
differences between diverse income groups for financial information transparency. Post
Hoc tests incIude a Scheffe test and LSD test to identify which groups differ significantly
from each other.

The final results show that there were differences for financial

information transparency among the four income groups in the study. Therefore, there
were significant differences which existed among the four income groups for financial
information transparency. Income group 4 (more than 35,000USD) had more. concern
about financial information transparency which includes ownership structure, financial
transparency, and information disclosure, and board structure, information and process in
the Taiwan stock market. On the other hand, group 1 (less than 10,OOOUSD) paid less
attention to the financial information transparency, especially in the ownership structure
and board process with corporations in the stock market. The findings also supported the
hypothesis.

Research Question 3
Are there differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different categories
of investor experience?
ANOVA analysis was used to examine whether there are any statistical
differences between diverse investing experience year groups in investor behavior, Post
Hoc tests include a Scheffe test and LSD test to identi@ which groups differ significantly
from each other. The final results represent that there was no difference in any of the
levels of investing experience group. Therefore, there were no significant differences
existing among the three groups for investor behavior. The findings also rejected

hypothesis.
Generally, the findings support Born et al's (2004) proposition that improving
corporate governance can lead improvements in information asymmetry between
company and investors. The findings also support Chiang (2005) who found that
corporate transparency impacts the corporate performance and investor relationship. The
findings are also consistent with the concept of Uddin and Gillett (2002) that investor
behavior might affect corporate transparency and perfomance.
The results of the study were consistent with Rezaee et al's (2003) findings that
board structure and process impacts investor behavior. The findings also confirm RandOy
et al's (2003) and Leng's (2004) proposition that board performance impacts corporate
performance and investor relationship. The findings also confirm the concept of Ajzen
and Fishbein (1980), and Donaldson and Davis (1994) that investor behavior will affect
corporate governance and corporate performance.
The findings supported Flouris and Walker (2005) who indicated that better
financial performance would enhance investors' confidence and interest. The findings
also supported Luoma and Goodstein (1999) who indicated that larger corporations have
more stakeholder directors on the board to monitor company transparency. The findings
do not support Fraser (2004) in investor expectations. The findings also do not support
Gelt and Strawer (2003) that corporate social responsibility impacts investor behavior.

Practical Implications

Financial information transparency in the Taiwan Stock Market needs to be
improved upon. This will require change. However, financial information transparency is
not a guaranteed path to success for co~porationsand investors. There are lots of reasons
that can affect investor behavior in the stock market. As stock market investing is
growing in popularity, the more quantitatively empirical. studies in this area are needed
for investors.
This study cites some practical implications for creating transparency in the stock
market:
1. Among the three major financial information transparency independent variables,

board structure had the most effect on investor behavior. Additionally, board structure
was the strongest persuasive predictor for investor behavior. Therefore, if
corporations want to create a long-term relationship with investors, the most
important strategy is to provide more transparency of board structure, members'
personal and trading information, and board committee process for investors in the
stock market.

2. The results of the multiple regression analysis showed that the independent variables
had a moderately strong effect on investor behavior in the stock market. This
indicated that improving financial information transparency with corporations can
increase investor activities in the stock market. This finding illustrates that
corporations could benefit from improving financial information transparency which
could maintain the relationship with the investor.

3. The results of this study indicated that males and females were significantly different

of financial information transparency; ownership structure, financial transparency,
and board structure. This means that males were more concerned with strong
.

financial information transparency than females in the stock market, particularly in
board structure and financial transparency. Therefore, if corporations want to target
males, they might consider improving board process information and transparency in
the stock market to attract more investors.

Conclusion

The impact of financial information transparency on investor confidence in the
Taiwan stock market needs to be addressed. However, it also raises many questions and
doubts for investors. This study focused on financial information transparency, which
influences investors' behavior in the stock market. Investor behavior has been widely
discussed for a few years, but the stock market has changed rapidly since financial
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia. Investors need more information about financial
information transparency to secure their investment.
This research implemented a mixed method to understand investor behavior in the
Taiwan stock market. The researcher expected that a mixed method could help to answer
existing questions and test the hypothesis. Therefore, this study identified how financial
information transparency impacted investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market.
This research has addressed and examined by different statistical analyses the
three research questions. 1. Is there a relationship between TSEC investor perceptions of
dimensions of financial information transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan

!

Stock Market? 2. Are there differences in TSEC investor perceptions of each dimension
of financial information transparency according to demographic variables? 3. Are there
differences in TSEC investor behavior according to different categories of investor
experience? This study also has tested one hypothesis. H: TSEC investor perceptions of
financial information transparency dimensions, investor demographic, and investor
experience are significant explanatory variables of investor behavior in the TSEC.
Generally, the study found that improving financial information transparency will
lead to increase investor activity in the stock market. These findings support the initial
assumption of the studies, improving financial information transparency in corporations
can positively affect investor behavior.
In conclusion, the improvements of financial information transparency address
stock market efficiency. Corporations need to understand that continuing to improve
financial information transparency is a way to maintain the relationship with the investor.
This study provides suggestions to improve financial information transparency to create a
win-win situation for companies.

Limitations of the Study
The following are some limitations, which need to be considered with the
research findings:

1. Sample limitation. The sample of this study may not be representative of the
population of the other countries' investors, because the sample is only derived from
Taiwan stock market. Due to the nature of the sample, the generalizability of the
finding is somewhat limited.

2. Independent variables. Financial information transparency was developed for

independent variables that affect investor behavior in this study. More independent
.

variables need to be identified in future studies for a better understanding of the stock
market.

3. Corresponding finding. The research context of the present study is the stock m d e t ,

the corresponding findings may not be applicable in other financial product markets
such as corporate bond market, derivatives market, and other financial markets.

Recommendations for Future Study

There are few empirical studies concerning the relationship between financial
transparency and investor behavior in the Taiwan stock market. This study provides some
findings to fill this gap. Future research may consider both pedagogical and operational
studies in this area. Recommendations for future study include:

1. Cross-cultural comparison. Additional studies should consider stock markets in
different countries to compare investor behavior in markets such as the New York
Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

The cross-cultural comparison may help us understand if different cultures behave
differently as investors.

2. Other specific independent variables. This study focused on financial information
transparency. Future study may consider other specific factors that can affect investor
behavior in the stock market such as corporate governance, corporate accounting
performance, the regulations of a stock exchange, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

3. Improving reliability and validity. For future study, other researchers may replicate

the research process which was created by the researcher. Additionally, researchers
may add more questions and items to the questionnaire, reword questions to avoid
participants from misunderstanding the questions, and revise the instrument to avoid
bias so that reliability and validity are enhanced.
4. Other statistical analyses. MANOVA and SEM may be recommended for future study.

Descriptive statistics, independent sample t test, correlation, ANOVA, and multiple
regression analysis were used in this survey. MANOVA and SEM analyses are
recommended for future study to discover other findings.
5. Future study should also examine if differences in investor behavior exist for

situations such as; established public companies versus those at the IPO stage,
long-term investors versus speculators, and institutional investors versus individual
investors.
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The Investor Behavior Questionnaire
Suwey Instructions

Please follow the directions below to complete this survey.
In answering all of the questions, please use a scale from 1 to 9 where 1 means
"very strongly disagree", 5 means "neither agree nor disagree", and 9 means
"very strongly agree". Write a number in the space provided that best indicates

your feelings about the question.

Section I: Financial Information Transparency and Disclosure
Rate the following questions from 1 to 9. Please use the scale as explained in the survey instructions.

Transparency of Ownership

1. -The company's web site helps me to understand ownership structure
information.
2.

Shareholder meetings help me to understand a corporation's performance.

3- -I will buy a corporation's shares if it offers specific ownership structure

information to me.
Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure
4. -The company's web site helps me to understand financial information.
5.

I will buy a corporation shares if it offers timely financial information to me.

6. -I trust a corporation's financial statements.

7. -I trust a corporation's financial statements that are approved by an
independent accountant.
8. -I believe that good information transparency will make the stock market more

efficient?
Board Structure and Process
9. -I will buy a corporation's shares if it provides pertinent information on its

Board members.

I will buy shares if a corporation demonstrates both financial success and

10.

social responsibility.
Section 2: Investor Behavior
Rate the following questions from 1 to 9. Please use the scale as explained in the survey instructions.

Corporate Scandals
11.

Corporate scandals make me reduce my shareholding.

12.

Corporate scandals make me lose confidence in the stock market.

13.

Corporate scandals are the responsibility of accountants.
Government Regulations

14.

Government regulations such as Sarbanes-OxleyAct. 2002, in the United
States make me more likely to buy a corporation shares.

Please write your responds regarding your basic information
15. Gender
Male

Female

16. Age
18-30

31-45

D

46-60

more than 60 years old

17. Highest Level of Education
High school degree or under

2 years college degree

Bachelors degree

Masters degree or above
18. Experience in buying corporation shares
less than 4 years

4 to 9 years

more than 9 years

19. Annual income (USD)

13less than 10,000

10,000 to 25,000

25,001 to 35,000

niore than 35,000

20. Do you have any additional comments regarding investor behavior? Please write
below:
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